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With the Department of Defense's budget continuing to be reduced, Anny 
acquisition managers must acquire superior weapon systems within shorter time periods with 
less resources. One effective way to accomplish this with relatively small, urgently needed 
acquisition programs is through the Anny's W arfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). 
This thesis uses a case study of the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle-Enhanced (BSFV-
E) air defense system to determine the impact of the WRAP upon accelerated acquisition. 
WRAP transitions compelling US Anny Training and Doctrine Command Battle Lab 
successes into rapid acquisition successes. Lessons learned from the BSFV-E case are 
identified which might be used by other acquisition managers to effectively manage programs 
which emerge as Battle Lab experimentation successes and are approved for rapid acquisition 
through the WRAP process. 
One lesson learned is that BSFV-E's streamlined acquisition process permitted a 
significant reduction in the administrative and procedural requirements which typically burden 
systems development. Also, this case study identified that lack of funding for WRAP 
programs such as the BSFV-E can potentially transform a rapid acquisition effort into a 
business-as-usual program. This study concludes that the BSFV-E is an excellent acquisition 
streamlining role model. 
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Just as the document "From the Sea" has shaped the way the United States Navy 
will fight in the future, the Army's "Force XXI Campaign" provides that Service's current 
overarching vision. Force XXI is the Army framework which balances today's operational 
challenges with an understanding of what capabilities are needed to meet future challenges. 
In light of the rapidly increasing rate of change in both technological advancements and the 
strategic global environment, the Army must enter the business of "changing the way it 
changes." [Ref 1] 
In May 1992, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) Battle Laboratories (Battle Labs) were founded to help identify the 
components needed by the Army to stay at the forefront of this wave of change. These 
TRADOC organizations were charged with the mission of cataloging and experimenting 
with warfighting concepts and requirements for new doctrine, training, leader development, 
organizations, materiel and soldier systems (DTLOMS). By addressing DTLOMS, Battle 
Labs streamlined the inter-relationships between concept development, generation of 
requirements, development of solutions, and operational testing. In addition to 
concentrating on the areas traditionally sponsored by TRADOC agencies such as tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, Battle Labs also focused upon the potential benefits provided 
by both mature and newly emerging technologies in the field of materiel development. 
One example of a streamlined materiel development tool which developed from this 
Battle Lab warfighting experimentation is the Army's W arfighting Rapid Acquisition 
Program (WRAP). WRAP was implemented to transition Battle Lab warfighting 
experiment successes into successful streamlined acquisition programs. 
This thesis examines the effectiveness of WRAP through a case analysis of the 
development of the BSFV-E (Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle-Enhanced), or Bradley 
Linebacker, air defense system. The BSFV-E program is one of the Army's first WRAP 
ventures. Many lessons have been learned from analysis of the BSFV-E program. 
However, because the BSFV-E program constitutes only one data point, it is impossible to 
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say that the lessons learned from the BSFV-E case study have general applicability to all 
other systems and Battle Labs in the Army. 
B. OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact that the Army's Warfighting 
Rapid Acquisition Program had upon acquisition streamlining using a case analysis of the 
BSFV-E program. Lessons will be identified that may help other acquisition managers to 
more effectively manage similar programs and help students studying acquisition 
management. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following primary research question asks: what impact has the Army's 
Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program had in influencing acquisition streamlining as 
evidenced by a case study of the BSFV-E program? 
The subsidiary questions are: 
• What significant role do the Battle Labs play in the Army today? 
• Is the BSFV-E program a good example of proven acquisition reform? 
Why? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis covers only those aspects relating to the BSFV-E program, WRAP and 
TRADOC Battle Labs' Advanced Warfighting Experiments. Additionally, because this 
thesis focuses primarily on the program management and not on technical aspects, 
classified aspects of the BSFV-E will not be included. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEWS AND METHODOLOGY 
Background research was obtained from periodicals, reports, papers, DoD 
documents, and US Army manuals obtained from the Defense Technical Information 
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Center (DTIC), the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), and the 
Naval Postgraduate School Library. The Forward Area Air Defense (F AAD) Project 
Office at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama was the primary source of information on the BSFV-
E. Interviews with current and former BSFV-E program personnel were conducted and 
program documents were examined. Additional program information came from: 
• Boeing Aerospace, Missiles & Space Division of the Boeing Defense & 
Space Group, Huntsville, Alabama 
• Hughes Missile Systems Company, Tucson, Arizona 
• United Defense Limited Partnership, San Jose, California. 
For the WRAP and Battle Lab information, interviews were also conducted with 
personnel from: 
• Assistant Secretary of the Army, Research, Development and Acquisition, 
Washington D.C. 
• Commanding General, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia 
• Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, 
Headquarters, TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia 
• Battle Lab Integration, Technology, and Concepts Directorate, TRADOC, 
Fort Monroe, Virginia 
• Program Management and Policy Division, Headquarters, TRADOC, Fort 
Monroe, Virginia 
• Directorate of Combat Developments, US Army Air Defense Artillery 
School, Fort Bliss, Texas 
• Forward Area Air Defense TRADOC System Manager, Fort Bliss, Texas 
• Air Defense Lab, US Army Air Defense Artillery School, Fort Bliss, 
Texas. 
F. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS 
Concepts used in this thesis are based upon DoD and Army definitions and 
acronyms relate to aspects of acquisition management, the Battle Labs, and BSFV-E 
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program. Definition of acquisition and program terms are provided throughout the thesis 
where needed. Appendix A provides a consolidated list of acronyms. 
G. ORGANIZATION 
The organization of this thesis includes an introduction, three development chapters 
and a final chapter of conclusions and recommendations. Chapter II provides a brief 
review of how the Army's Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) has developed 
from the Army's Force XXI vision and TRADOC Battle Labs. Chapter III provides an 
analysis of the acquisition strategy used in the BSFV-E acquisition program. Chapter IV 
examines the effectiveness of WRAP and other acquisition streamlining measures used in 
the BSFV-E program. Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations. Thesis 
organization is graphically depicted in Figure 1-1. 
I Chapter I 
•Scope j • Changing Threa~ · .. · ·. .· Chapter IV 
---. Chapter V 
.1ntr0 . . . . II Chapter Ill Chapter Ill 
• Methodology • Force XXI .·.·I ··System Description 
.organization 
1 
... J.· ointVenture 1 • Historical · ·Le5sons I 
· • Battle Labs I Background Learned from . 
• .AWEs · • Air Defense Lab ' WRAP & Other 1 ·Conclusion & . ~WRAP Initiative I Bradley I Recommendations! 
1
1 
• Acquisition Strategy I Linebacker ! 
I 
Reform 1 
'-------~ l Measures I 
I 
__jJ 
Figure 1-1. Thesis Organization 
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II. WRAP: TRANSITIONING BATTLE LAB SUCCESSES INTO 
STREAMLINED ACQUISITION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will review the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Battle 
Lab program and will highlight one of the materiel development tools TRADOC provides 
to the Army to accomplish acquisition reform. This tool, the Warfighting Rapid 
Acquisition Program (WRAP), will be described in detail. In order to understand this 
WRAP process, one will need to know the components preceding it; these components are 
illustrated in a "waterfall" design which is depicted below in Figure 2-1. To accomplish 
this goal of describing WRAP, this chapter will begin by describing the nature of today's 
changing threat environment and how the Army has developed the current Force XXI 
concept to address the threat. Discussion will include highlighting how the Army uses 
doctrine, digital technologies and simulations to enhance Force XXI capabilities. This will 
be followed by an examination of Force XXI's Joint Venture program, TRADOC's 
program to transition the Army's operational forces into Force XXI, followed by a 
discussion of the Battle Labs themselves. Discussion of the Battle Labs will highlight their 
significant role within the Army today, especially one form of Battle Lab experimentation: 
the Advanced Warfighting Experiment (A WE). Although Battle Labs are involved in 
many different types of experiments besides these A WEs, this thesis will only discuss 
A WEs because the WRAP process relies upon accelerating the procurement of A WE-
proven systems, specifically. Finally, Chapter II concludes with a discussion of the WRAP 
process itself and how it is linked to the Battle Lab warfighting experimentation found in 
AWEs. 
Most of this discussion will not expressly address the BSFV-E weapon system; 
rather, it will provide a foundation for understanding some of the processes which 
influenced the development of the BSFV-E program. The relationship between WRAP 
and the BSFV-E program will not be specifically addressed until later in Chapters III and 
IV. 
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r CHANGING THREAT 
I ENVIRONMENT 
Necessitates a I 
fiaxib!e Fighting 
Force ..... FORCEXXI , 
Transition Army into a 
capabilities based 21st JOINT Century Fighting Force ..... 
, 
VENTURE 
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forces into Force XX! ob]ectives ..... BATILE 
,.. 
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conducting warfighting experimenta:ion ~ r AWE 1 , l I 
J 
Select warfighting experimentation 
WRAP successes for rapid acquisition ...... ,.. 
Figure 2-1. Chapter II Framework [Developed by Researcher] 
B. CHANGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT 
The Army has completed its transition from a Cold War fighting force primarily 
focused on the Soviet threat in the central European theater, to that of a power projection 
Army based primarily in the United States. Instead of facing a single organized threat 
which has been under American scrutiny for nearly half a century, this nation's military is 
now confronted with an environment where the only certainty is that the threat of today 
and tomorrow is not well known and is not likely to remain static. While facing an 
adversarial Soviet Union in the past may have fostered great tension, there was a certain 
solace in knowing who the enemy was. This certainty does not exist in today's global 
environment. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the science and technology 
developmental efforts of America's military-industrial complex were able to focus on a 
single enemy. Military strategy and supporting weapons research and development were 
primarily threat driven and relatively focused. Contemporary budget constraints and 
America's adoption of a two, near-simultaneous, medium regional conflict (~C) based 
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national military strategy have resulted in a shift from the forward-deployed military 
presence strategy of the past. 
Further complicating this ambiguity is an ever increasing global availability of 
threatening technology. In the past, the technology used in developing weapons of mass 
destruction was only possessed by a handful of countries. Now, the proliferation of 
relatively cheap yet effective technology, such as that found in ballistic missiles, is widely 
available to any nation who can pay for such a capability. This wide availability also 
presents a problem because it is difficult to discern just who has what threat capability now. 
Also contributing to this challenge is the rapid pace at which this technology advances 
today. 
This dynamic change in today's environment presents a more difficult challenge to 
the Anny than that posed in the past when America's military focused on getting inside the 
Soviet Union's military decision cycle to head off the threat. The ability to turn inside an 
opponent's decision cycle is significantly hampered when the Army does not even know 
whose decision cycle it should be concentrating against. The current TRADOC 
Commander, General Hartzog [Ref. 4], recognizes this change in the Army's environment; 
he states that America's Army will be required to deploy globally and should be prepared 




• Peacetime contingency operations 
• Domestic support 
• Overseas presence 
• Conflict prevention. 
The Army is confronted with the need to change in the face of such global realities 
as shifts in the international balance of power, explosive growth of high technology and 
changing US national priorities. All of these factors combine to challenge the Army with a 
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fundamental shift in what constitutes the environment. The changing way the Army looks 
at this threat is depicted in Figure 2-2. 
Threat Paradigm Shift 
Cold War 
• Fixed, defined threat 
• Easy to predict 
• Science &Technology 
focused on threat 
• Turn inside Soviet decision 
cycle 
I ??? I 
Current 
• Ambiguous threats 
• Hard to predict 
• High-payoff technologies 
widely available to enemy 
• Turn inside whose decision 
cycle? 
Figure 2-2. Threat Paradigm Shift After Ref [3] 
C. FORCEXXI 
The Army's senior leadership has recognized the changing nature of today's threat. 
To address the uncertainties of this dynamic environment, the Army's leadership realized 
that the Army's way of thinking about warfighting had to change and be as flexible as the 
threat it had to counter. To face this threat and prepare itself for the changing 
environment, the Anny developed a framework which would capitalize on a flexible and 
capable force which would be effective well into the 21st century. The framework of this 
capabilities-based Anny became known as the "Force XXI Campaign" plan. 
By committing to this profound and critical transformation towards the Army of the 
future, the Army has built a strong, flexible stance from which to address the changing 
nature of future threats. Furthermore, in adopting this new stance, the Anny has also 
recognized the related need to design an Army for the 21st Century around information 
technology. At the core ofthis transition remains the Anny's need to stay trained and 
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prepared in order to meet the needs of the country during a time of dwindling resources. 
[Ref 2] 
According to the principal architect, former Army Chief of Staff, General Sullivan, 
the mission of Force XXI is for:" the US Army (to) design the 21st century force ... to 
achieve related fielding and support decisions by the year 2000 in order to fully field the 
total Army force that is capable of meeting our Nation's 21st century challenges ... from 
foxhole to factory and front to rear." [Ref 7] 
Force XXI has been called America's Army for the 21st Century. It is the 
rethinking and reinvention of the force at all echelons so that the Army will be ready to 
perform whenever called upon in this ever-increasingly volatile and dynamic world. 
Crucial to this design is the structure of Force XXI around information and information 
technologies. One critical factor of this new plan is the capability to exploit information in 
innovative ways. Information, the reliance upon microprocessors and the myriad digital 
technologies emerging today, will be integrated in such a way that future capabilities will 
result in greatly enhanced coordination, accuracy and target destruction. [Ref 2] 
Force XXI significantly streamlines the process of fielding new capabilities through 
the horizontal integration ofwarfighting requirements and development of multiple 
solutions at the same time. In the Force XXI framework, information serves as the 
mechanism through which the leaders and soldiers of the Army are empowered to be more 
effective. This is a new way to think about controlling an army. Force XXI concentrates 
on building the Army around information management instead of killing systems [Ref 9]. 
Force XXI is best characterized as a continual learning process which is always 
subject to revision. This necessitates an environment where enhancements can be 
experimented with and the future can be explored in innovative, integrated ways. General 
Sullivan's underlying assumption in his vision for Force XXI was that no final solution 
would ever be presumed; instead, he used the notion of a "rolling baseline" in which 
operational and experimental experiences would be melded with study and doctrinal 
research. The results would then continue to be interpreted by senior Army leadership in 
order to determine where the Army should focus its efforts. [Ref. 2] 
9 
To implement this process, General Sullivan envisioned the use of "doctrine as the 
engine of change" which entailed using doctrinal standards to drive the Anny's training, 
combat development, and investment strategy in the brave new world of the Information 
Age. General Sullivan further noted that doctrine was a reflection of technology, or what 
he called the "tools of war." Doctrine and technology serve as the conceptual sources from 
which the Anny's schoolhouses construct the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the 
units comprising the Force XXI Anny. [Ref 2] 
today: 
This rethinking of the Anny is the result of several significant factors in America 
• A shift from a singular, clearly defined threat to facing countless poorly 
defined threats 
• A shift from an anti-Soviet defense model rooted in the Cold War to a 
national military strategy founded upon force projection 
• The progression of America from the industrial era to the information age. 
The transition of today's Anny into Force XXI is based upon the Anny 
implementing changes in the following three areas: 
• Doctrine 
• Digital Technologies 
• Simulations. 
1. Doctrine 
Innovative doctrine for the 21st Century affects how the Anny thinks, acts, and 
ultimately, what it becomes. In light of this, the service has been aggressively developing 
new doctrine and revising existing manuals. In 1993, the Army significantly updated its 
keystone warfighting text, Field Manual 100-5. Operations. Publication of FM 100-5 
marked the adoption of a doctrine of full-dimensional operations. It stressed the principles 
needed to maintain the edge in future theaters of war and showed how the art of battle 
command applied to those principles in a wide range of battlefield scenarios. This doctrine 
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was a fundamental shift from the narrower, more deterministic approach of the Cold War, 
with its focus on Central Europe. 
Even more recently, the Army released Training and Doctrine Command 
Pamphlet 525-5. Force XX! Operations, which provides the conceptual framework for 
changing the Army from a power projection force to an information age, full-dimensional 
force for the 21st Century. It is apparent that one of the Army's advantages for the future 
will rest on its ability to master information operations. Force XX! Operations examines 
the impact of information age technologies on the operational environment of the future. It 
also suggests crucial battle dynamics to be used if America is to continue to have the most 
powerful Army on earth. Perhaps most importantly, Force XX! Operations provides a 
clear direction for the future of Army operations on the joint battlefield of tomorrow. [Ref 
8] 
2. Modernization and Digital Technologies 
Another method for increasing capabilities in the Army force is to enhance 
equipment already in the field. The Army expects to accomplish this through the 
application of advanced computer technologies across existing weapon systems. By 
improving the information component of these families of systems, this activity (known as 
horizontal technology insertion) will produce synergistic improvements in equipment 
capability, performance, and total combat power. For example, in the spring of 1994, the 
Army's first digitized National Training Center (NTC) combat unit rotation 94-07, 
Operation Desert Hammer, at Fort Irwin, California, demonstrated that the digitization of 
an armored task force could significantly improve its lethality and survivability. Horizontal 
technology insertion across today's weapon systems is a potentially cost-effective means to 
achieve the objectives of Force XXI and dominate the 21st Century battlefield. [Ref 5] 
These Force XXI Modernization Objectives [Ref. 6:p. 13], later referred to as 
Army Modernization Objectives, include the five following enhanced capabilities: 
• Winning the information war 
• Conducting precision strikes 
• Projecting and sustaining combat power 
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• Dominating maneuver 
• Protection of the force. 
3. Simulations 
When the Army was forced to rely on large scale maneuvers for force development 
experiments, it looked at what existed at the time and imagined the rest. Now, the Army 
uses modem simulation systems to evaluate the possibilities for today, tomorrow, and the 
future. Nearly any option conceived today can be simulated. 
The advent of the high performance microprocessor allows the military planner to: 
• Replicate through simulation battlefield engagements using current tactics 
with current equipment 
• Simulate combat systems that do not exist yet 
• Run simulated battlefield scenarios over and over, varying different aspects. 
The Army classifies simulations into three categories. The first category is live 
simulations which are those conducted with real equipment and soldiers in a training 
environment that mimics combat conditions. Classic examples include the Army's training 
rotations at the National Training Center (NTC) and other Combat Training Centers 
(CTCs). 
Virtual simulations comprise the second category. Typically, these simulations are 
conducted with electronic mock-ups of real weapon systems which use computers to 
replicate on-board systems and the external combat environment. Flight and tank gunnery 
simulators are illustrative of these kinds of simulations. 
The final category consists of constructive simulations which replicate combat in 
the form of computer modeled war games. In some of these, the computer provides the 
participants with a graphical representation of the operational situation, allowing them to 
influence the situation. These models allow the Army to exercise in war games against a 
competent and active opponent. Other simulations run independently of human interaction 
once initial parameters and data are established. 
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All three forms of simulation have proven to be extremely effective training and 
developmental tools. They provide the military with a rich variety of combat scenarios and 
offer a means to customize training and development to the desired level. Today, 
simulations are used routinely and are combined in innovative and important ways. 
Perhaps most importantly, they serve as the principal tool of the Army Battle Labs and are 
increasingly useful in assisting the service to evolve into tomorrow's Army. [Ref. 6:p. 11] 
The Army has organized its efforts to achieve the 21st century force to best 
capitalize on these doctrinal changes, digital technologies and use of simulations. It has 
formulated its "Force XXI Campaign Plan" [Ref. 7] to achieve an enormous 
transformation based upon three axes, or programs (refer to Figure 2-3): 
• The redesign of operational forces -- i.e., the units assigned to the unified 
commands (what General Sullivan referred to as the Little "a" Army)--
J oint Venture 
• The redesign of the Institutional Army -- (Big "A" Army) 
• The development and acquisition of information age technologies and 
capabilities (under the auspices of the Army Digitization Office, ADO). 
Figure 2-3. Three Axes comprising Force XXI Campaign 
[Developed by Researcher] 
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Each of these axes interrelates with the other two. All these axes provide feedback 
between one another, but the ADO axis serves as a driver for the Join Venture and 
Institutional axes. Most importantly, when combined, these three axes represent a single 
purpose: the redesign of the Army for the 21st century. 
Through the utilization of an iterative series of rapid experimentation, learning, and 
decision making along these three vectors, Force XXI provides the necessary critical 
components, processes, and change needed for fielding America's 21st century Army. 
General Sullivan intended to "control the power of information and technology and 
incorporate unprecedented battle command capabilities in order to ensure increased 
capabilities for a more lethal, more mobile, and more survivable fighting force by 
exploiting the Army's modernization focus." Force XXI provides a tightly woven series of 
cyclical actions which identify and incorporate design tools and experiments to reach 
interim solutions. [Ref 7] 
D. JOINT VENTURE 
Joint Venture is a TRADOC Force XXI program which plans, develops and 
executes change of the Army's operational forces through an iterative cycle of 
concept development, force design and experimentation. [Ref 3] 
The reengineering of the operational forces found in the unified commands is 
called Joint Venture because it frames a partnership or teaming of all the Army's major 
commands with the Army staff while concurrently exploring new concepts previously 
unknown. Headed by the TRADOC Commander who is responsible for its overall 
coordination, Joint Venture is based upon design principles which were intended by 
General Sullivan to symbolize the best judgment of the four star commanders on how to 
"organize around information." 
Joint Venture provides the means to reengineer operational concepts, units, and the 
Army's sustaining base to achieve victory on tomorrow's battlefields. The experimental 
process has been developed to gain insights into improved performance measured against 
relevant mission requirements of the future. Whenever possible, this experimentation is 
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designed to be fully integrated and synchronized, but it can be sequential when necessary. 
Joint Venture takes the best of what the Anny has today by way of values and culture and 
integrates these into the Force XXI of tomorrow. The personnel involved in Joint Venture 
recognize that the quantum leaps in effectiveness wrought by Force XXI via the discovery 
of successful "nuggets" will be accompanied by ineffective measures as well. Though it 
seeks to achieve real discovery, it also has accounted for and accepts the occurrence of 
some false leads and failures. 
E. BATTLE LABS 
Battle Labs are TRADOC organizations which plan and conduct the Army's 
warfighting experiments to provide senior Army leadership with additional 
battlefield insights. 
Battle Labs Maximize Battlefield 
Advantages By Breaking Paradigms 
Battle Labs are a means to · 
experiment with ideas, 
concepts .and technology ... 
. .. horizontally integrated 
· across the entire force ... 
... to maximize ourbattlefield 
' advantage in lethality, 
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Figure 2-4. Battle Labs Maximize Battlefield Advantages After Ref. [3] 
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Organized in April 1992, Battle Laboratories are a TRADOC-led innovation to 
evoke the image of soldiers experimenting with warfighting concepts in order to generate 
battlefield insights. They were created as a means of preserving the US Army's edge in 
contemporary strategic, policy, threat, and technology environments. Battle Labs provide a 
focused TRADOC effort to institutionalize new warfighting ideas, technologies, and 
techniques and are designed and organized to rapidly modify/improve battlefield 
capabilities through experimentation. Battle Labs were created to prevent the generation of 
requirements in a vacuum. Figure 2-4 above depicts how Battle Labs maximize the Army's 
combat effectiveness by implementing changes in organizational design, technology and 
tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). 
As a National Performance Review Reinvention Laboratory, Army Battle Labs 
support TRADOC's Joint Venture effort [Ref 6:p. 4] by providing a flexible means to 
identify better ways to conduct warfighting. As hosts of an exchange between the Army 
and industry's technology, research and development communities, Battle Labs identify 
which technology has the greatest warfighting potential and follow this up with insights for 
future resourcing decisions. "TRADOC established six Battle Labs to identify, develop 
and experiment with new warfighting concepts and capabilities offered by emerging 
technologies. They are the test beds for the major Force XXI experiments." [Ref. 14] 
Battle labs examine changing the nature of warfighting through the use of 
battlefield dynamics concepts by involving the Army staff, Army Materiel Command 
(AMC), Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC), operational forces around 
the world, and other Services in their activities. Battlefield dynamic concepts comprise the 
organizational structure ofTRADOC's Battle Labs and include: 
• Depth and Simultaneous Attack (DS&A) 
• Early Entry, Lethality and Survivability (EELS) 
• Battle Command (BC) 
• Combat Service Support (CSS) 
• Dismounted Battle Space (DBS) 
• Mounted Battle Space (DBS). 
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The Battle Labs are involved in the following types of experiments in order to 
facilitate the exploration of new warfighting concept: 
• Simulations 
• Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) 
• Advanced Concepts in Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) 
• Advanced Warfighting Experiments (A WEs) 
• Experimental Force (EXFOR). 
Simulations furnish "proof of principle" by exercising prototyped organizations, 
technology, and doctrine. The maturity of these technologies can then be assessed by the 
ATDs and ACTDs. The application of technology to the Army's warfighting organizations 
can be rigorously tested through A WEs. Finally, the EXFOR allows real soldiers and units 
the opportunity to confirm the changes found by the analysis and simulation. The resulting 
synergy from the combination of these five components produces a product which 
identifies, acquires, and assimilates emerging technologies, then integrates this technology 
with organizational/doctrinal changes swiftly and accurately [Ref 10]. Only one of these 
five components will be addressed in detail later in the chapter because the others are 
outside the scope of this thesis. This thesis will be limited to a discussion of the Advanced 
Warfighting Experiment because it is this Battle Lab initiative which enables the 
Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) to provide a means of accelerated 
acquisition for the Army. 
Within TRADOC, Battle Labs report directly to the TRADOC Commander, but 
they are not subordinate to any service school, center, or other TRADOC activity. Each of 
these labs has a general officer, chartered by the TRADOC Commander, who is 
responsible for the overall direction, oversight, and integration of actions regarding their 
respective battlefield dynamic area. Battlefield dynamic areas include all related combat 
and force development efforts across the doctrine, training, leader development, 
organizations, materiel and soldier systems (DTLOMS) spectrum. Staffed with multi-
disciplinary personnel that represent the combined arms and services teams, they are 
supported by operations research and systems analysis (ORSA) and Acquisition Corps 
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personnel. In addition to the actual Battle Labs, all TRADOC service schools and centers 
have Battle Lab Support Elements (BLSEs) in their respective headquarters organizations 
which manage service school/center involvement in Battle Lab experiments. Since the 
nature of the experimentation calls for a horizontal insertion across the Army, Battle Labs 
are also supported by representatives from AMC, Research Development and Engineering 
Centers (RDECs), OPTEC, and the Army Science Board (ASB). Finally, the TRADOC 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments serves as the Battle Labs 
Program executive agency. [Ref 11] The various Battle Labs are explained below. The 
Battle Lab process is depicted in Figure 2-5; it illustrates how Battle Labs can be used by 
the Army to examine concepts to determine if they need to be: 
• Experimented with further 
• Revised conceptually 
• Fielded to the force 
• Discarded. 
Battle Labs 
(organized by Battle Dynamics The Battle Lab Process 
- see page 16) 
-Depth and Simultaneous Attack (D&SA) Battle Lab 
<Early Entiy Lethality and Survivability (EELS) Battle Lab 
<Battle Command (BC) Battle Lab 
.Combat Service Support (CSS) Battle Lab 
-Dismounted Battle Space (DBS) Battle Lab 
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There are currently six operational 1RADOC Battle Labs which correspond to the 
battle dynamics. They are described below. 
The Depth and Simultaneous Attack (DS&A) Battle Lab, located at Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma, explores how to: 
• Refine requirements to detect and identify enemy forces throughout the 
depth of the battlefield 
• Transfer that message in near-real-time from sensors to enagagement 
systems 
• Conduct unilateral and joint strikes to defeat them. 
The Early Entry Lethality and Survivability (EELS) Lab, based in Fort Monroe, 
Virginia, concentrates its efforts on how to: 
• Enhance projection planning, preparation and execution capabilities to 
speed up timetables to quickly deploy/redeploy forces 
• Experiment with existing, future, and alternative means to improve strategic 
mobility 
• Integrate the unique capabilities of other Services and the special operations 
forces (SOF). 
The Battle Command (BC) Battle Lab has elements at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 
Fort Gordon, Georgia; and Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Together, all three elements integrate 
1RADOC activity which involves the art and science of battle command and information 
warfare. The Battle Command Battle Lab experiments with: 
• The "art of command" 
• Issues regarding the technical methods of command and communications 
• Issues concerning intelligence collection and dissemination. 
The charter of the Fort Lee, Virginia-based Combat Service Support (CSS) Battle 
Lab is to provide the overall direction and horizontal integration for the combat service 
support battlefield dynamic area which entails getting the right resources to the right place 
at the right time, every time. 
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Located at Fort Benning, Georgia, the Dismounted Battle Space (DBS) Lab is 
chartered with integrating all TRADOC activities which deal with soldiers operating in the 
dismounted battle space. 
The final TRADOC Battle Lab, the Mounted Battle Space (J\1BS) Battle Lab, 
which is based at Fort Knox, Kentucky, is charged with the responsibility of preparing the 
Army to win in the mounted battle space. 
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Figure 2-6. TRADOC Battle Lab Locations After Ref. [6] 
The foremost focus of the Battle Lab process is the development of today's Army 
into the 21st Century Anny. This focus includes all five of the Force XXI objectives 
espoused by General Sullivan in his "Army Modernization Objectives," listed earlier in this 
chapter on page 11. Battle Labs are charged with the responsibility for using interactive 
Advanced Warfighting Experiments to support the crucial decisions the Anny must make 
about future DTLOMS issues. [Ref. 6: p.13] 
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F. ADVANCED WARFIGHTING EXPERIMENTS 
Advanced Warfighting Experiments are Battle Lab conducted experiments 
using field soldiers, real units and relevant scenarios to provide Army 
leadership with ways to increase warfighting capabilities. 
One principal tool of the Force XXI Campaign is the experimental methodology 
established in the Battlefield Laboratories Program. The digitized Army of the 21st Century 
will depend upon experiential data provided by Advanced Warfighting Experiments (A WE) 
conducted by the Battle Labs. The A WEs are warfighting exercises in which new 
technology is put through its paces, and new doctrine and unit designs are tested. 
Conducted in a series of iterative cycles, these experiments take place from company to 
corps level and provide the information for interim design decisions and future 
experiments. Warfighting experimentation is depicted in Figure 2-7. 
These resource intensive, Chief of Staff of the Army approved exercises are 
supported by multi-disciplinary integrated concept teams (ICTs). The ICT methodology is 
to "brainstorm concepts from both visionary and practical perspectives with the goal of 
shortening the requirements determination 'event' by providing better early focus [Ref 
12]." The use ofICTs in A WEs helps Army leaders make better and faster decisions. 
"Integrated concept teams are partnerships between those who do the warfighting, those 
who develop and test equipment, and those who buy the equipment [Ref 4]." 
Complementing the existing integrated product team (IPT) process used by materiel 
developers to manage system development, ICTs consist of representatives from [Ref 
12:p. 6]: 
• Combat Developers 
• Training Developers 
• Materiel Developers 
• Testers 
• Cost Analysts 
• Acquisition and Contracting Specialists 




• Battle Labs. 
The policies, procedures, and responsibilities of the Battle Labs are outlined in 
TRADOC Regulation 11-1. This document identifies A WEs as the center piece of the 
Battle Lab process. This process begins with the formulation of hypotheses to enhance 
battle results through improvements in lethality and survivability. A solution is selected 
based on technology, training, organizational or doctrine change, and that solution is then 
carried forward to design of experiments. These experiments are then executed through a 
combination of constructive and virtual simulations. If a hypothesis requires additional 
validation, Battle Labs conduct A WEs against an opposing force to make the assessment 
as realistic and rigorous as possible. [Ref. 13] 
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Figure 2-7. Warfighting Experimentation After Ref. [3] 
The following two sub-sections provide an illustration of two actual Advanced 
Warfighting Experiments -- one from the past and one scheduled for the near future. The 
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first, Operation Hammer, was conducted in the Spring of 1994. The second, Task Force 
XXI, is scheduled for March 1997. 
1. Operation Desert Hammer 
One past example of integrating technology and experiments with training occurred 
at the National Training Center in April 1994 (NTC combat unit rotation 94-07), during an 
advanced warfighting experiment called Operation Desert Hammer. The purpose of this 
A WE was to test the following central hypothesis: if digital electronics and developmental 
systems are horizontally inserted into an existing organization, using current doctrine and 
tactics, then increases in lethality, survivability, and tempo across the force will be 
achieved. Operation Desert Hammer was not designed to strictly control for each of the 
developmental systems and digitization equipment used in this warfighting experiment. 
Instead, it examined the many information-age technologies used in this experiment in an 
attempt to gain broad insights on their warfighting benefits and determine where the Army 
stood in terms of providing doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment for future 
combat units. 
In this Desert Hammer A WE, a battalion task force and its supporting elements 
became the first formation of that size to be digitized. In two weeks of intense, 
force-on-force maneuver and live-fire training, deployed units honed their warfighting and 
leadership skills in the same manner as other combined arms forces that train throughout 
the year in the desert environment of Fort Irwin, California. What was unique about this 
event was that the training force was linked with digital technology in a realistic combat 
environment. Participating Desert Hammer units achieved demanding training objectives 
while simultaneously experimenting with state-of-the-art equipment and technology. 
A platoon of digitized Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicles (BSFVs) from the Air 
Defense Artillery (ADA) community participated in this A WE and achieved impressive 
results. This platoon ofBSFVs, comprised of Man Portable Air Defense System 
(MANP ADS) Stinger teams deployed on Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles, were 
equipped with digital forward area air defense command and control equipment for early 
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warning ( cueing)/situational awareness and were joined by a single modified BSFV system 
called the BSFV-E (Enhanced). This BSFV-E possessed the additional capability of 
engaging airborne threats with a vehicle mounted Stinger launcher (which obviated the 
need for the BSFV-E's Stinger team to leave the armored protection of the vehicle in order 
to fire their Stinger missiles). 
Using this complement ofBSFVs and BSFV-E air defense weapon systems, air 
defense personnel set a National Training Center record by registering a more than 80 
percent aerial target kill rate. Numbers of air defense engagements made possible by this 
enhanced information sharing nearly doubled the number of kills made when compared 
with previous non-digitized NTC rotations. These statistics highlight the increase in air 
defense lethality gained by the successful sharing of digitized information. This 
information sharing led to another positive result when Blue force losses to enemy air 
attack dropped from 2. 8 to 1. 7 systems per battle during a deliberate attack mission. 
National Training Center combat unit rotation 94-07 is depicted in Figure 2-8 below. 
[Ref 5] [Ref 12] 
I Digitized Battlefield: NTC 94-07 
Conducted by the Mounted Battlespace Lab 
Tested effect of horizontal insertion of developmental items 
upon lethality, survivability and tempo of existing 
organizations 
BSFV-E prototype participated in ADA C21 cueing and 
situational awareness exercises: 
Alrder&nse ffffls doubled In numberofeng11gt>ments 
Losses to &nemy air attack dropped from 2.8 to 1.7 Blue Force systems perballfe 
Set NTC fflCOni by fflgfstering 11n 80+% aerial target kill rate versus the avt>rage of 42% 
BOTTOM LINE: 
Significant increases in lethality and 
survivability result from application of 
horizontal insertion. 
Figure 2-8. Operation Desert Hammer (NTC 94-07) After Ref [5] 
24 
In addition to exemplifying how digitization of the force can increase lethality, this 
Operation Desert Hammer A WE also demonstrated the Army's ability to train for combat 
and experiment simultaneously. Participating units achieved demanding combat training 
objectives while experimenting with a variety of new equipment and digital systems. This 
illustrates how Battle Lab conducted A WEs can use training opportunities to achieve Force 
XXI objectives of providing insights into the future of warfare. 
2. Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment 
Battle Lab contributions to Force XXI objectives will be further demonstrated by 
the upcoming Task Force XXI A WE. Task Force XXI is an Army warfighting experiment 
which will use actual soldiers and units in a brigade sized experimental force (EXFOR) 
being formed from the reorganization of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort 
Hood, Texas. Task Force XXI, currently scheduled for operational status in March 1997, 
will provide an understanding of future division and corps organizations and will serve as 
the baseline for follow-on experiments throughout the decade. In Task Force XXI, the 
Army is fielding new equipment and a series of computer systems and other digital 
equipment that is expected to revolutionize the amount and use of information available at 
all levels. In this A WE, the Army has committed to experimenting with over 97 new and 
different concepts. Task Force XXI will also field 87 new or experimental systems to 
heavy forces and 37 systems to light forces in the EXFOR. Task Force XXI will 
experiment with 21st century warfighting concepts and technologies which take advantage 
of information management. This application of information power is expected to provide 
the Army's EXFOR with a common vision of the battlefield which will be used to 
dominate and shape that battlefield. Task Force XXI's concept is based on [Ref 4]: 
• Linking strategic, operational and tactical sensors to gain near real-time 
situational awareness 
• Anticipating an accelerated tempo of operations made possible by the 
passage of continuous, real-time information 
• Linking sensors to shooters in an anticipatory rather than reactive manner. 
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G. WARFIGHTING RAPID ACQUISITION PROGRAM POLICY 
1. Tiger Team -- Rapid Acquisition Initiative Background 
Battle Lab experimentation involves exploring materiel solutions to fulfill urgent 
Army needs. Personnel in TRADOC recognized that the A WE process could potentially 
yield successful materiel systems as well as doctrinal concepts. Presented with this 
opportunity to capitalize upon A WE successes, the Army initiated a program to assess 
whether TRADOC could influence the acquisition process through the Battle Labs' 
AWEs. 
This investigation revealed that the requirements generation of the traditional 
acquisition cycle could potentially be significantly impacted by Battle Lab experimental 
methodology. TRADOC became particularly interested in identifying obvious Battle Lab 
successes for expedited fielding. In 1994, the Army Acquisition Executive designated a 
Rapid Acquisition Tiger Team (RATT) to explore innovative approaches to acquisition 
streamlining. This Tiger Team approach had been used previously in other Services with 
varying degrees of success. For instance, the Navy employed a "Tiger Team" to develop 
the T-45 training aircraft. Similarly, the 1994 Army Tiger Team focused on two aspects: 
one being oriented on process and the second emphasizing experimental approaches to 
rapid acquisition. [Ref. 15] 
Four Army acquisition programs were subsequently selected by the Secretary of the 
Army for Research, Development and Acquisition for close study by the Tiger Team in 
conjunction with Battle Lab support. These programs were: 
• Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle -- Enhanced (BSFV-E) 
• Advanced Precision Airborne Delivery System (AP ADS) 
• Under Armor Auxiliary Power Plant (UAAPU) 
• Super High Frequency (SHF) Tri-band Advanced Range Extension --
Terminal (STAR-T). 
Resultant studies led to significant recommendations by the Tiger Team. 
Addressing the Battle Lab Advanced Warfighter Experiment process, the Tiger Team 
recommended that integrated teams, comprised of testers, trainers, combat and material 
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developers, analytical experts, acquisition professionals, and industry be more fully utilized 
in acquisition program planning and development. The Tiger Team also suggested that 
working groups should manage simulations during conduct of Battle Lab Experiment 
Plans. These recommendations have since been adopted in the Army's TRADOC 
Regulation 11-1. 
Of the original four programs examined by the Tiger Team, two were successful 
Battle Lab initiatives which would eventually become Force XXI's initial rapid acquisition 
ventures. These two systems which continued as TRADOC rapid acquisition programs 
were the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle - Enhanced (BSFV-E) and the Advanced 
Precision Airborne Delivery System (APADS). Both programs were approved for limited 
procurement for additional experimentation by a process which became known as the 
Army's Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). The scope of this case study is 
limited to a discussion of the BSFV-E program. The APADS program encountered 
significant funding issues shortly after receiving rapid acquisition status which prevented it 
from progressing as far as the BSFV-E program has [Ref 45]. 
2. Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program Purpose 
WRAP is a TRADOC mechanism to accelerate the acquisition of 
selected operational warfighting enhancements resulting from successful 
warfighting experiments; WRAP is a link between TRADOC experimentation 
and the Army's systems acquisition. 
The Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) sought to accelerate the 
procurement of urgently needed systems which had been identified as overwhelming 
successes during the Advanced Warfighting Experiments conducted by the Battle Labs. 
WRAP was formalized as an official Army policy on 11 April 1996 by the Army 
Acquisition Executive (AAE) after having been proven through the success of its first four 
candidate test case systems. It started off initially as an experimental effort which 
eventually became institutionalized by the Army. WRAP operated in a quicker, more cost 
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effective manner than previously possible under the traditional acquisition system. The 
WRAP policy is consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). [Ref 16] 
3. W arfighting Rapid Acquisition Program Process 
WRAP furnishes the TRADOC Commander with a vehicle to significantly speed 
up the acquisition of selected operational warfighting improvements. These enhancements 
originate from successful Advanced Warfighting Experiments. In accordance with 
TRADOC Regulation 11-1, Battlefield Laboratories Program, these warfighting 
experiments are accomplished by an integrated concept team (ICT) organization 
recommended by the 1994 Tiger Team study. This ICT is charged with development of 
the Battle Lab Experimentation Plan (BLEP), a document which details the objectives, 
resources and methodology of the Battle Lab warfighting experimentation process for each 
experiment. Results from the BLEP are subsequently used by the TRADOC Commander 
to select candidate systems for rapid acquisition which then undergo a review and approval 
by the governing WRAP Council. This WRAP Council serves in place of the Army 
Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) found in the traditional acquisition process. 
[Ref. 16] [Ref 13] 
The linkage between WRAP and Battle Lab A WEs is depicted in Figure 2-9. 
TRADOC screens promising warfighting concepts for their potential to increase the 
Army's warfighting capability. Once these concepts are identified, TRADOC's Battle 
Labs carry out their primary responsibility of planning and conducting Advanced 
Warfighting Experiments which focus on these selected ideas. After A WEs have 
concluded, any compelling, successful warfighting ideas are selected as candidates for 
WRAP consideration. The WRAP Council then decides which of these successful 
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Figure 2-9. A WE - WRAP Linkage [Developed by Researcher] 
4. Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program Documentation 
WRAP implements one aspect of acquisition reform by minimizing the program 
documentation required by the WRAP Council. Documentation, used as the basis for a 
WRAP decision, consists of a Battle Lab Experimentation Plan (BLEP) [Ref 16] which 
includes: 
• An urgency of need statement from the user community 
• Experimentation results which substantiate compelling success 
• An acquisition strategy 
• An estimated budget for the proposed program. 
In addition to the BLEP, the WRAP Council also requires an Operational 
Requirement Statement for Rapid Acquisition (ORD) [Ref 16] which must contain: 
• The relevant sections of the latest Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) 
• A listing of all threats to the prospective system 
• A description of what the system is intended to do operationally 
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• Any specific parameters which could limit the prospective system's 
capabilities. 
Though these requirements seem abundant, they are generally reduced in 
comparison to the quantity of documentation required for conventional acquisition 
programs. 
The WRAP Council is comprised of the following members or their 
representatives: 
• Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, 
Development, and Acquisition), WRAP co-chair 
• Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Force 
Development, WRAP co-chair 
• Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research) (DUSA(OR)) 
• Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and 
Comptroller )(ASA(FM&C)) 
• Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics, and Environment) 
(ASA(IL&E)) 
• CG, US Army Materiel Command 
• CG, TRADOC 
• CG, Operational Test and Evaluation Command 
• Director, Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications 
And Computers (DISC4) 
• Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DC SLOG) 
• Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) 
• Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (DP AE). 
A WRAP Council determines if a nominated system under consideration is 
affordable, effective, sustainable, and merits rapid acquisition. In deciding whether or not 
to apply this accelerated acquisition process to a candidate system, the WRAP Council will 
[Ref 16]: 
• Review requirement and urgency 
• Review affordability 
• Review experimentation results 
• Approve an acquisition strategy 
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• Assign management responsibilities to a designated Program Executive 
Officer (PEO)/ Project Manager (PM) or AMC Advanced Concept 
Manager 
• Assign a milestone entry point as appropriate 
• Approve a funding strategy. 
It is important to note that nominated systems which have been approved for rapid 
acquisition are not guaranteed funding just because they have received WRAP approval. 
Although there is no funding stream attached to WRAP Council decisions as of the time 
this thesis is being written, the current policy states that approved programs will be funded 
as prototypes for two years. But without a specified source for funding, this portion of the 
policy appears to be a weak link of the WRAP process. [Ref 16] [Ref 17] [Ref 18] 
H. SUMMARY 
Chapter II has examined how the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program has 
evolved from Battle Lab experimentation and the Army's Force XXI initiative. The 
dynamic nature of the changing environment confronting America today necessitates that 
its Army develop a flexible, capabilities-based Force XXI, different from the previous 
approach which focused predominately on a Soviet threat. The Army's Training and 
Doctrine Command's Joint Venture effort serves as an enabler for the transition of the 
Army's operational forces into a 21st century fighting force. Capitalizing on revolutionary 
advances in simulation, TRADOC's Battle Labs experiment with emerging technologies 
and warfighting ideas to gain battlefield insights. These insights are furnished to the senior 
Army leadership for information needed to make resourcing decisions. Battle Labs plan 
and conduct TRADOC Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs) from which come 
potential rapid acquisition opportunities. Finally, the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition 
Program transitions successes from these A WEs into accelerated acquisition successes for 
the Army. WRAP is a bridge linking TRADOC experimentation and Army systems 
acquisition [Ref 16]. 
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III. BRADLEY STINGER FIGHTING VEHICLE -- ENHANCED 
The Force XXI Campaign is a mammoth project to redesign, build and 
equip the Army with the latest and most efficient use of technologies... (it) 
is the Army's most ambitious overhaul since the early 1940's. It not only 
encompasses the redesign of tactical units, but of major headquarters, 
schools and the procurement system. [Ref. 14] 
A. BSFV-E SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
One of the two successful Battle Lab initiatives assessed by the first WRAP Council 
in January 1995 was the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle-Enhanced (BSFV-E) program. 
Although this weapon system predates the Force XXI transition, Battle Labs, and Tiger 
Team enterprises, it has been significantly influenced by tremendous political support 
resulting from A WEs. 
Figure 3-1. BSFV-E 
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The BSFV-E is an acquisition category (ACAT) IV program costing $20.1 
million. It is an integration of non-developmental components. The program has been 
authorized to acquire eight initial prototype platforms for Battle Lab experimentation in 
support of the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment and concurrent 
operational testing. Funding has also recently been provided for the fielding of 
approximately sixty additional BSFV-Es to the 24th Infantry (Mechanized) Division, 1st 
Cavalry Division, and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. The program focuses on 
modifying government furnished equipment (GFE) components such as the Bradley 
Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) by mounting a Stinger air defense missile standard 
vehicle-mounted launcher (SVML) in place of the existing tube-launched, optically 
tracked wire-guided (TOW) launcher on the M2A2 Bradley chassis. All the normal 
Bradley functions except the TOW missile system will be retained by the modified system. 
In addition to replacing the TOW with a four-missile Stinger launcher, enhancements 
include: 
• Forward Area Air Defense (F AAD) Command, Control, and Intelligence 
(C2I) target display capability 
• Azimuth and elevation cues to the gunner 
• Slew-to-cue capability 
• Target acquisition-on-the-move and shoot-on-the-move capabilities. 
The BSFV-E air defense system will be capable of engaging all threat targets such 
as aircraft, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UA Vs) within the engagement 
boundaries of the Stinger missile. The system is designed to perform these functions using 
existing US Army Avenger air defense system hardware and software. Survivability for 
the crew has been significantly enhanced by performing engagements from inside the 
armor protection of the vehicle. Critical components of the BSFV-E include: the Standard 
Vehicle Mounted Launcher with four "fire and forget" Stinger missiles, a 25 mm chain gun 
and digital communications equipment with the capabilities to acquire targets and "shoot-
on-the-move." 
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The BSFV-E will be crewed by four soldiers and will operate in platoons of five 
vehicles. However, the platoon leader vehicle in a BSFV-E platoon will not possess any 
Stinger or slew-to-cue capability but will retain the TOW missile engagement capability of 
the BSFV. This platoon leader's vehicle will also be augmented by a F AAD C2I 
enhancement. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Ground-based air defense is a critical battlefield operating system requiring 
thorough planning and total integration of weapon systems. One of the most challenging 
roles of any ground-based air defense system is the protection of a large maneuver element 
such as a heavy mechanized division or an armored cavalry regiment. The development of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), proliferation of cruise missile technology, and the 
technical increases and sheer numbers of fixed wing and rotary wing threat aircraft require 
a ground-based air defense system that is lethal, survivable and flexible. The weapon 
system that continues to be at the heart of America's short range ground based air defense 
systems is the Stinger surface-to-air missile. When integrated with a capable, armored 
troop carrier, such as a Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), the Stinger missile can 
provide adequate air defense coverage to heavy mechanized units deployed close to the 
forward line of troops (FLOT). 
The United States Army continued to refine its Divisional Air Defense System 
following the fielding of the Stinger missile throughout the 1980s. After the cancellation of 
the Sergeant York divisional air defense artillery gun (DIV AD) program in 1985, the Army 
was forced to take a hard look at the serious deficiencies in meeting its forward area air 
defense requirements. Of major concern was the potential threat posed by enemy rotary 
winged (RW) aircraft. The Forward Area Air Defense Working Group at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Air Defense Artillery Lay down Group at Fort Bliss, Texas, 
were formed to address these problems and find solutions. The result was the development 
of the Forward Area Air Defense (F AAD) concept, a system of integrated systems 
designed for air defense in forward areas. This concept was approved in 1986 by then 
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Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and was perceived by many to be the solution to 
fill the void left in wake of the Sergeant York Gun crisis. [Ref 19] [Ref 20] 
The original F AAD concept system consisted of the following integrated 
components: 
• Line-of-sight Forward Heavy (LOS-F(H)) elements 
• Non-line-of-sight (NLOS) component 
• Line-of-sight Rear (LOS-R) elements 
• Combined Arms Initiative (CAI) which made minor air defense related 
modifications to existing weapon systems~ i.e., adding an air defense sight to 
armored vehicles such as the Ml Tank or the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting 
Vehicle 
• Required Command, Control and Intelligence (C2I) to tie the systems 
together. 
Initial development of the system proceeded rapidly. However, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, coupled with declining budgets and political outcry for a so-called peace 
dividend, dramatically slowed development of the proposed Forward Area Air Defense 
systems. The Anny was still able to procure and test Avenger (LOS-R), prototype Air 
Defense Anti-Tank System (ADATS) (LOS-F(H)) and prototype Fiber Optic Guided 
Missile (FOG-M) (NLOS) systems. 
Of these, Avenger became the only original F AAD program which would survive 
and progress into full scale production. This lightweight, highly mobile system (fire unit) 
incorporates the following components: 
• Eight Stinger missiles 
• Fire control electronics 
• Forward looking infrared (FLIR) 
• Laser range finder 
• Standard Vehicle Mounted Launcher. 
Operated with a 2-man crew, the system can provide twenty-four hour, all-weather 
air defense protection. The Avenger carries eight Stinger missiles in two launch pods on a 
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gyro-stabilized turret which provides the ability to "shoot-on-the-move," a critical feature 
in light of today's mobile battlefield. Currently in production, over 750 fire units have 
been delivered to the US Army and the USMC by the program's prime contractor, Boeing 
Defense & Space Group. [Ref. 21] 
1. Budget Impacts Upon FAAD 
Budget streamlining forced the cancellation of the AD ATS program in February 
1992; this component had been scheduled to fulfill the LOS-F(H) system requirement in 
the F AAD system [Ref. 22]. The Army has since fielded the Bradley Stinger Fighting 
Vehicle, Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), Under Armor (BSFV-MUA) 
as an interim solution. [Ref. 23] This system is nothing more than a M2A2 Bradley 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been modified to carry a MANP ADS Stinger 
team with 6 Stinger missiles stored in internal stowage racks. 
Employing the Stinger missile provides some measure of air defense engagement 
capability for the BSFV-MUA. However as configured, the system lacks shoot-on-the-
move capability, quick reaction times and survivability because the Stinger team must 
dismount from the vehicle in order to engage air defense threats. These inherent problems 
greatly reduce the mission capability of the system, especially when employed in a rapidly 
moving, fluid environment. Presently, Stinger teams riding in Bradleys can keep up with 
their supported infantry and armor units, at least until they are needed. Then, in the heat 
of battle, they must dismount to acquire and engage their potential target(s). This practice 
is inherently flawed because it exposes the dismounted and unprotected Stinger team to 
direct and indirect fire while the force they are supposed to protect continues to maneuver. 
Another prime disadvantage of the BSFV-MUA concept is that cueing, or early warning 
about the direction of incoming threats, is severely limited for the dismounted Stinger team. 
Once dismounted from the vehicle, the Stinger team will likely fmd itself exposed on a 
noisy, threatening and confusing battlefield without a reliable communication link to their 
air defense early warning network. Under current air defense doctrine, this early warning is 
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critical, and without it, air defense capability is significantly degraded. Thus the BSFV-
MUA configuration clearly suffers from inherent weaknesses. [Ref 24] 
2. Continued Need For Heavy Division Air Defense 
The official Mission Needs Statement for the FAAD system was approved in 1986. 
Although the threat has greatly changed since that time, there remains a need for even 
better heavy division air defense. The High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
(HMMWV) mounted Avenger (Line-of-Sight Rear, LOS-R) component of the original 
F AAD systems is not well suited for maneuver with mechanized infantry and armor; it is 
employed more effectively for static defense of brigade and division rear area assets. 
The Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) was originally intended to be an 
interim solution, replacing the venerable Vulcan 20mm air defense gun system's 1960s 
technology until the LOS-F(H) could be fielded (originally scheduled in the Spring of 
1994). However, the temporary solution took on increased significance in February 1992 
when the Secretary of Defense terminated LOS-F(H), also known as the Air Defense Anti-
Tank System (ADATS). [Ref 20] A detailed chronology of key events in the development 
of the BSFV-E program is found in Appendix B. 
3. Changing Air Defense Threat 
Following the fall of the USSR, the US Army could not justify the cost and 
extensive capabilities of the complete F AAD system package. The capabilities of this 
complex system far exceeded a potential enemy's threat in the post-Warsaw pact context. 
It was more cost effective to place 10 Stinger MANP ADS teams on the battlefield in 
Bradley IFVs for the price of one very sophisticated and expensive LOS-F(H). This quick 
fix concept, the BSFV-MUA, allowed heavy division Stinger teams to keep up with their 
combined arms counterparts while providing force protection. 
This approach was substantiated by a study commissioned by the United States 
Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADASCH). The Division Air Defense Study 
(DADS) was initiated in October 1992 to revisit the Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD) 
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system concept to determine what the air defense requirements were for the post-Cold 
War, force projection Anny. An important result of this study was that the Anny 
recognized that the air threat had changed significantly. According to this study, the fixed-
wing threat to Anny ground forces had declined due to a greater reliance on the US Air 
Force and other Services to address that threat. While noting that the fixed-wing threat 
may have decreased, the DADS also recognized that the threat from unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) had surfaced as well. [Ref 25, Nov 93, p. 7] 
Current Anny doctrine emphasizes the importance of controlling battlefield in-
formation. This reliance on information depends upon maintaining the element of surprise~ 
therefore, mission accomplishment is at risk if counter reconnaissance, surveillance and 
target acquisition missions against UA Vs are not successful. Consequently, DADS called 
for a capability against these UAVs. 
While DADS addressed the emerging UAV threat, it also noted that attack 
helicopters remained the chief threat to maneuver forces in the close battle. The deep 
attack threat from these aircraft was recognized by the study as well. The DADS 
recommended that the F AAD concept be revised to include: 
• Countering UA Vs 
• De-emphasizing defense against fixed-wing aircraft 
• Enhancing the capability to defend against helicopters. 
This USAADASCH study recognized that improvements in lethality and 
survivability of the Anny's Stinger platforms were critical if the Anny intended to maintain 
a credible capability against the helicopter threat. Since the conclusion of DADS, other air 
defense threats have emerged. Most notable have been the advancements in cruise missile 
technology. Cruise missiles have become increasingly accessible to many countries and 
present a growing concern worldwide. Also, the introduction of low observable 
technology (stealth) has rendered many existing air defense systems either wholly or 
partially ineffective. 
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C. AIR DEFENSE BATTLE LAB INITIATIVE 
Even prior to the DADS initiation, the Commanding General [Ref 26] of the US 
Army Air Defense Center expressed his intent to meld the non-developmental components 
of the Bradley IFV, the Avenger's Standard Vehicle Mounted Launcher (SVML), and the 
Stinger missile to achieve the synergism of integrated systems. In September 1992 the Air 
Defense Lab began developmental testing with industry to come up with the best method 
to integrate the components. The recommended solution, the Bradley Stinger Fighting 
Vehicle-Enhanced (BSFV-E), was the least expensive of the alternatives studied [Ref. 28]. 
The BSFV-E uses the current Bradley Fighting Vehicle turret with some modifications. 
By December 1992, the BSFV-E prototype had successfully engaged a helicopter with a 
Stinger launched from an Air-to-Air Stinger (ATAS) rail-mounted on the Bradley's TOW 
launcher. The Bradley TOW launcher pod is replaced by an Avenger SVML. The 
associated fire control modifications are minimal and are already fielded with the Avenger. 
The prototype demonstrated that the off-the-shelf hardware could be integrated and 
the crew could successfully use the cueing from sensor systems to engage a target while 
remaining inside the vehicle. While this highlighted a much needed improvement in 
survivability, it is important to remember that gains in lethality in the BSFV-E resulted 
from the leveraging of the F AAD C2I components. [Ref. 27] 
In an article published in the Army Times, LTG Jay Gamer, a former Force XXI 
project officer, identified several key factors of success for Force XXI. The Air Defense 
Lab's BSFV-E initiative capitalized upon two ofLTG Gamer's key factors: 
• The ability to establish and maintain common situational awareness 
among the combatants on the battlefield. This situational awareness 
is shared through vertical and horizontal sharing of digital 
information. 
• The ability to compress data and information into targeting terms 
rapidly. [Ref 14] 
Focusing on survivability, target acquisition and fire control, the Air Defense Lab 
demonstrated these warfighting enhancements to the BSFV-E in a three-phased series of 
experiments [Ref 25, Nov 93, p.4]. These three phases were: 
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• Phase I - Successfully engage a target while under armor 
• Phase II - Improve target acquisition 
• Phase III - Demonstrate an integrated system. 
In December 1992, Phase I was conducted as a proof of principle to demonstrate 
the ability to successfully engage a target with the crew under armor. The prototype 
system included an ATAS launcher and integrated fire control. In this configuration, the 
crew remained inside the BSFV while engaging the target. Two missiles were fired and 
both registered hits on a static target at ranges greater than three kilometers. 
Phase II was conducted by the Air Defense Lab in February 1993 to demonstrate 
the technologies to enhance tracking and acquisition. Improvements included networking 
with the F AAD C2I air defense net and the addition of an on-board passive sensor. 
Phase III demonstrated system integration and included: 
• SVML (replaced ATAS rails) 
• Upgraded integrated sight unit (ISU) with forward looking infrared radar 
(FLIR) 
• Televised Video (TV) 
• Laser range finder 
• Auto tracking 
• Automated lead angle and superelevation 
• Simplified hand-held terminal unit (SHTU) for linking to the F AAD C2I net 
• Positive navigational device. 
Phase III demonstrated the ability to acquire surrogate cruise missile targets as well 
as fixed and rotary-winged aircraft. Phase ill concluded in August 1993 with the 
successful engagement of three moving helicopters: two QUID Hueys at ranges of2500 
and 2700 meters and a QS55 Hind surrogate at 2500 meters. The total RDT &E costs for 
the three phases of Air Defense Lab BSFV-E experimentation amounted to about $6 
million [Ref 30] and was financed primarily by United Defense Limited Partnership 
(UDLP) with some supplemental government funding. Figure 3-2 depicts the growth of 
the BSFV-E over time. 
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Figure 3-2. Growth Path ofBSFV-E During Air Defense Lab Experimentation 
[Developed by Researcher] 
1. Use of Virtual Prototyping 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, TRADOC Battle Labs have extensively used 
simulations to rapidly leverage new technologies. Simulations also facilitate the preparation 
of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) needed to train soldiers in the use of new 
systems. In addition, tests using simulators can provide insights to determine effectiveness 
and performance of specific components. This use of simulations can greatly reduce the 
amount of developmental and operational testing which is usually required in a traditional 
acquisition program. The Air Defense Branch is responsible for providing key air defense 
related inputs to the TRADOC Battle Labs and accomplishes this through the efforts of the 
Air Defense Lab, a TRADOC chartered Battle Lab Support Element (BLSE). The Air 
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Defense Lab and the TRADOC Battle Labs work together to test developments, future 
capabilities and future requirements. [Ref. 35] 
In November 1992, Congress directed that the Anny perform an Air Defense 
Artillery (ADA) turret study to evaluate contractor proposals to fill the Anny's operational 
need for its Forward Area Air Defense system. The Battle Labs' capability to test in a 
virtual environment was well suited to fulfill this Congressional directive. With support 
from the Air Defense Lab, the Forward Area Air Defense (F AAD) Project Manager was 
assigned responsibility for testing the three contractor (Boeing, Martin Marietta, United 
Defense [formerly FMC]) proposals which had been submitted in response to the 
government's request for candidate systems. This ADA turret study evaluated the several 
incremental solutions for affordability and operational effectiveness using PM FAAD's 
Virtual Prototype Simulator (VPS). The resulting Virtual Prototype Simulator "shoot off' 
provided data which later would serve as the basis for a Cost and Operational Effectiveness 
Analysis (COEA) Report for the BSFV-E. This ADA turret study concluded in 
December 1994. [Ref. 25, April 94, p.2] [Ref. 35] 
In addition to being used by the ADA turret study, VPS was used in the BSFV-E 
program to create and experience a variety oftest scenarios without going to the test range. 
It immersed users in real-time, interactive environments and permitted: 
• Reconfigurable-analysis of different components for effect on system 
performance 
• Development of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) prior to 
availability of hardware 
• Training plan development 
• Early testing (without hardware), including operational testing. 
2. Testing 
The largest single time saver in the BSFV-E Program Schedule proved to be the 
limited testing required. As the chairman of the Battle Lab Experiment Senior Officer 
Review Committee (BLESOROC), CG TRADOC appointed a Simulations Working 
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Group (SWG) which was composed of representatives from about a dozen agencies who 
had an input to, or a requirement from, the use of simulations in this project. PEO 
Tactical Missiles, Operational Test Command (OPTEC) and the Army Material Systems 
Analysis Activity (AMSAA) were all represented [Ref 31] in the SWG when they 
reached an agreement to primarily test this system through simulation and analysis. This 
decision was based upon an acceptance of the data gained from the virtual prototyping 
experiences in the Congressionally mandated ADA turret study. In addition, live fire by 
analysis of the BSFV-E was approved by AMSAA. Prior Battle Lab Experimentation Plan 
(BLEP) coordination also resulted in early approval of the Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
(TEMP). All these factors combined to greatly reduce the amount of developmental and 
operational testing required of the BSFV-E. This significantly contributed to a shorter 
acquisition cycle and reduced acquisition costs. 
D. BSFV-E PROGRAM ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) [Ref 33] was signed by the 
Commanding General of the United States Army Air Defense Center in August 1994. 
This ORD specified near-term required capabilities which were already available 
commercially off-the-shelf, and which would transform the existing Bradley Stinger 
Fighting Vehicle -MANPADS Under Armor (BSFV-MUA) variant, making it a more 
mobile, survivable, and lethal weapon platform. The Commanding General, United States 
Army Air Defense Center, acting as steward for the Air Defense user community, 
subsequently nominated the BSFV-E program to TRADOC as its candidate for the Rapid 
Acquisition Tiger Team (RATT) in an Urgency of Need Statement issued on 16 
September 1994 [Ref 34]. The program was subsequently selected as one of only four 
programs being evaluated by the Army service-wide. The Battle Lab Experiment Plan 
(BLEP) [Ref 35] was prepared by the joint efforts of the Air Defense Lab and the Project 
Manager-Forward Area Air Defense (PM-F AAD) and encompassed the following 
documentation: 
• Required Operational Capabilities for the BSFV-E 
• Urgency of Needs Statement 
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• Live fire test strategy 
• Acquisition strategy for follow-on rapid acquisition which was derived from 
the previous Congressionally mandated turret study 
• Estimate of required funding. 
CG TRADOC approved this BLEP on 6 December 1994, after which these 
documents were presented to the Commanding General of the United States Army Air 
Defense Center for his consideration as to whether BSFV-E's early Battle Lab success 
warranted a request for rapid acquisition status. 
In December 1994, this ACAT IV, non-developmental item program, for which 
90% [Ref 29] of the required materiel was available off-the-shelf, received its Milestone II 
approval from Program Executive Officer, Army Tactical Missiles. Approval was given to 
start work on the request for proposal and performance specifications. The additional 
support of the Commanding General, MICOM was gained on 29 December 1994, and 
later proved to be instrumental in providing the needed presence to push this program 
forward. Additional guidance from the PEO, Tactical Missiles [Ref 36], to the BSFV-E 
Product Manager stated that ( 1) if possible, award contract without a best and final offer 
(BAFO) and without negotiations and (2) award contract prior to 1 April 1995; this was 
driven by the necessity to have prototypes along with trained soldiers ready for Task Force 
XXI A WE in March 1997. The program operated on the margin and success in A WEs 
was its only hope of survival [Ref 36]. A Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program 
(WRAP) Council Milestone Illa decision was reached on 26 January 1995, approving 
limited production. The principal documentation required for this Milestone Illa decision 
included [Ref. 37]: 
• BSFV-E Mission Needs Statement 
• Battle Lab Experiment Plan (BLEP) 
• Abbreviated Operational Requirements Document. 
Table 3-1 [Ref. 37] highlights some of the significant events leading up to the 
award of the contract. A more detailed chronology of program milestones is included in 
AppendixB. 
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1. Contracting Milestones 
Critical contract milestones (refer to Table 3-2) began with a Commerce Business 
Daily announcement on 18 January 1995. Proposals were received from the two offerors 
on 13 March 1995. The contracting officer served as Source Selection Authority and 
awarded a contract to Boeing Defense and Space Group on 30 March 1995. 
BSFV-E Key Events Timetable 
BLEP 6DEC1994 
ORD 11DEC1994 
Milestone 0,1,II week of 18-22 DEC 1994 
Acquisition Plan lOJAN 1995 
Acquisition Strategy Report lOJAN 1995 
Justification & Approval 15JAN 1995 
Commerce Business Daily 18JAN1995 
Announcement 
Performance Specification 20JAN 1995 
DraftRFP 25JAN 1995 
WRAP Council (Milestone ma) 26JAN 1995 
RFP 9FEB 1995 
Proposals Received 13 MAR1995 
Proposal Evaluation 13- 22MAR1995 
Source Selection Authority Decision 22MAR1995 
Contract Award 30MAR1995 
Table 3-1. BSFV-E Key Events Timetable [Ref. 37] 
The BSFV-E Product Manager's goal was originally to ensure first unit equipped 
(FUE) within two years to enable participation in the Army's Advanced Warfighting 
Experiment with eight BSFV-E configured systems. This BSFV-E project office plan 
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projects subsequent fielding to Force Package I units after the Task Force XXI A WE is 
expected to conclude. As of now, funding exists for the first eight fire units which will 
participate in the A WE and for nearly sixty more weapon systems which will be allocated 
to Force Package I units plus the training base at the US Army Air Defense Artillery 
Center at Fort Bliss, Texas. The initial quantity of eight BSFV-Es have already concluded 
IOTE and will participate in the Task Force XXI A WE in March 1997 [Ref. 29]. 
BSFV-E Contracting Schedule 
Commerce Business Daily 18JAN1995 
Announcement 
Draft RFP (Given to Offerors) 25JAN 1995 
Pre-Solicitation Meeting 1FEB1995 
Issuance of Solicitation (RFP) 9FEB 1995 
Receipt of Proposals 13MAR1995 
Technical Evaluation 13 - 22 MAR 1995 
SSA Analysis 23 - 29 MAR 1995 
PEO Briefing 25MAR1995 
Complete Evaluation of Proposals 27MAR1995 
Contract Preparation, Review & 29MAR1995 
Clearance 
Contract Finalization 30MAR1995 
A ward Contract 30MAR1995 
Debrief 3APR1995 
Table 3-2. BSFV-E Contracting Schedule [Ref 37] 
2. Competition 
The competition for this $20,092,824.00 [Ref 38] contract (acquiring sixty eight 
BSFV-Es) was based upon a competitive request for proposal with firm, fixed-price 
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structure and contractor incentives to meet the eight systems required for participation in 
the Army's Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment. Competing contractors 
included two consortiums. 
• Boeing as a prime contractor and Martin Marietta as a principal 
subcontractor 
• Team comprised of United Defense Limited Partnership (UDLP, previously 
FMC); Hughes Electro-Optical; Hughes Missile Systems and TRW. 
The UDLP/Hughes team possessed the only physically existing prototype which 
had been used in the Air Defense Lab-sponsored experimentation and NTC combat unit 
rotation 94-07, the Army's first major digitized field exercise. UDLP/Hughes team came 
with a broad depth of experience in Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (United Defense) 
and the Stinger (Hughes) missile systems. Likewise, Boeing brought its work on the 
Avenger (LOS-R) air defense system and a virtual prototype ofBSFV-E to the table. In 
this competition, there were no negotiations as each contractor's initial bid served as their 
final offer [Ref. 39]. 
Although some of the contractors involved lobbied hard for sole source contracts, 
PM-F AAD made the decision to host a competitive contract. According to the product 
manager [Ref. 29] and program executive officer [Ref. 36], this ultimately enabled the 
program office to realize the purchase of substantially more technical capability at a 
significantly lower price than they could have hoped for otherwise, had it been a sole 
source situation from the start. 
In arriving at the decision on how to conduct the competition for the contract, the 
program office weighed the benefits of awarding without negotiations against the related 
disadvantages. Without negotiations, the program would be able to effect the most timely 
contract, exposing itself to less schedule risk, and award a contract based upon a clear 
technical winner. Some of the contract risks were that the contract was contingent on 
unprogrammed funding and there was considerably increased likelihood of a protest. Use 
of a draft RFP process reduced the risk of serious flaws in the contractual requirements. 
[Ref. 37] 
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The program office also considered the advantages that might accrue from the 
negotiating process, such as possible price reductions and minimized grounds for protest. 
In comparing both the advantages and disadvantages, the program office concluded that 
negotiations would escalate program schedule risk, make a best value determination more 
difficult to arrive at, increase the potential for technical leveling, and possibly result in 
delays of thirty days or more. 
In hindsight, it appears that the program office decision to proceed with competitive 
proposals and without negotiations served them well. No protests resulted and the 
program's senior leadership believe they received the best deal possible [Ref. 36] [Ref. 
37]. 
3. Source Selection Process & Pricing Analysis 
The source selection process for the BSFV-E utilized four areas for evaluation: 
• Technical 
• Price 
• Past Performance (not addressed in this thesis) 
• Management (not addressed in this thesis). 
The technical element was further broken down into: performance/concept, 
integrated logistics support, product assurance, configuration management, and test. The 
technical element was weighted most heavily, followed by price, and then past 
performance and management (which were equivalent in weight). Qualitative ratings, 
founded upon an adjectival basis, were applied to the different areas of evaluation to take 
into account apparent differences. Offerors were not told the exact weighting of each 
evaluation criterion; however, they were informed as to the relative weighting of the 
different factors. This source selection process is depicted in Figure 3-3. [Ref. 37] 
United Defense's loss ofthis contract, and the fact that it had purportedly sunk a 
substantial sum into the development of wha~ had been the only existing prototype of the 
BSFV-E during the Air Defense Lab's experimentation [Ref. 30], reflects an area of 
concern for industry and Government alike: how does one (either contractor or 
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Government agency) strike an equitable bargain through which both sides are protected? 
Is it unreasonable for UDLP to expect something in return for its investment in the 
hardware prototype development? This issue will be discussed at greater length in the 
following chapter ofthis thesis. 
Because this contract's source selection was based upon a competitive, best value 
evaluation, using a firm fixed-price (FFP) structure, there was no need for a detailed audit. 
There was also no requirement for certified cost and pricing data to be submitted by the 
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Figure 3-3. Source Selection Process After Ref. [37] 
Contract 
Award Debrief 
contractors. The decision to proceed without negotiations also meant that there was no 
need for a pre-negotiation business clearance memorandum. In addition, a detailed pricing 
analysis was not performed. However, a price analysis comparison by contract line item 
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number (CLINs) and amount for each CLIN was conducted to establish relative 
differences between the two different proposals. This price analysis did indicate that 
Boeing's prices as proposed were fair and reasonable. [Ref 40] 
In the supporting documentation, a memorandum for record substituted for what 
would have been a post negotiation memorandum had the competition involved 
negotiations. This record documented that [Ref. 39]: 
• Reviews of the proposals received from solicitation of the BSFV-E RFP 
from both UDLP and Boeing were in accordance with the FAR 
• The RFP stated that the award would be made to the offeror judged to 
present the best value to the Government in accordance with the evaluation 
criteria 
• It was unnecessary to require certified cost and pricing data because this 
award was based upon competition 
• The RFP had allowed for award without discussions, but reserved the right 
to negotiate or not, as necessary 
• The method used to establish and conduct the evaluation considered 
extensive technical, price, management and past performance of both 
offerors and made a recommendation to the source selection authority 
(SSA) 
• The contracting officer, serving as the SSA, awarded the BSFV-E contract 
to Boeing Defense and Space Group based upon the evaluation factors and 
after determining that the recipient of the contract award was both 
responsive and responsible within the meaning of the FAR. 
4. Effects of Acquisition Reform 
The willingness of the contractor to support the program has also been instrumental 
in the BSFV-E's success: Boeing's integrated product team (IPT) leader [Ref. 42] for this 
program very emphatically states that the integrated process team approach and the rapid 
acquisition process showcased in the program have been "an excellent way to do business 
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-- and was much more than mere lip service or use of current buzz words." The Boeing 
program manager [Ref 43] supported this by citing three specific reasons why Boeing's 
use ofIPTs was successful: 
• Customer (Anny project office) was an active member of the IPT 
• All IPT members were empowered to make decisions 
• Boeing's IPT leadership and the customer shared common objectives and a 
common vision from the onset of the program. 
Besides referring to IPTs as an example of acquisition reform encompassed in the 
this program, the Boeing program manager [Ref. 43] cited the advantages ofISO 9000 
practices incorporated within the project. He stated that the use of commercial 
specifications and standards in lieu of MILSPECs [military specifications] reflects an 
important example of how the BSFV-E exemplifies acquisition reform. Instead of some 
forty or fifty military specifications, the development ofBSFV-E relied upon only three 
MILSPECs to deliver the first production unit in less than twelve months from contract 
award. 
E. SUMMARY 
The BSFV-E (Boeing proposal) was selected and the program was considered a 
suitable candidate for the Anny's W arfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) for 
several reasons. First, the mission need statement for the Forward Area Air Defense 
system had gained wide acceptance since its approval in January 1986. The BSFV-E did 
not require development of new technology, only integration of existing components and 
these components' planned upgrades. Also, under the guidelines of the DoD 5000 series 
publications, tailored acquisition strategies which take advantage of opportunities to 
compress the traditional acquisition phases were encouraged. The big ticket items like the 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Stinger missiles were already assigned to the receiving air 
defense units. Because of the extensive use of the existing components, much of the 
lengthy and costly testing for safety, environmental, survivability had already been 
documented. Extensive retesting of these components for the minor changes was not 
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necessary and would be redundant. Finally, the BSFV-E was deemed suitable based upon 
its success during prior experimentation. BSFV-E acquisition strategy called for its entry 
into low rate initial production with eight systems available for the critical Advanced 
Warfighter Experiment, Task Force XXI, which is being planned for March 1997 [Ref. 
29]. [Ref. 24] 
The BSFV-E program has demonstrated that the Government can meet the 
challenge of expedited acquisition methods to improve upon the old ways of doing 
business. But without the necessary funding, these advancements would have amounted to 
little more than good theory. 
The PM-F AAD office feels that the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle - Enhanced 
program has been a role model for the rest of the Army acquisition process to take note of. 
The BSFV-E product manager's assessment is that effective use of acquisition streamlining 
initiatives pushed this program to the forefront of the Army's new way of doing things 
better, faster, and cheaper. 
Technical concerns were addressed up front during the discussion phase until all 
offerors were comfortable and then the competition commenced. Since the contractors 
knew that they had only one chance to shine, they were incentivized to do so. The 
elimination of extraneous requirements by the program's Technical Evaluation Committee 
created a lean and effective framework for contractor selection. Ultimately, these factors 
came together and provided for a lower price along with higher performance than what the 
Government's product manager [Ref. 29] had expected. However, the methods used by 
the BSFV-E program are not boiler plate solutions to be applied generically to all other 
programs; these methods proved effective because of many influencing factors: 
• Army's adoption of the BSFV-E program as a designated fast track 
acquisition model to prove WRAP process 
• Relatively small size of the program 
• Limited scope of the problem and use ofNDI 
• Criticality of Task Force XXI AWE 
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• Synergy resulting from the program's emphasis upon teaming and 
partnership between the Government and contractor program offices 
• Fervent support by the parent PEO organization. 
TRADOC has recognized that its Battle Labs can contribute to acquisition reform 
by leveraging both new and mature technologies and facilitating an accelerated acquisition 
process. The BSFV-E is the first weapon system to highlight how Battle Labs and the 
WRAP process can do more than just launch good ideas into the materiel development 
arena. According to General James J. Cravens, Jr. (current Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Combat Developments, Headquarters, TRADOC), BSFV-E is an excellent model for 
Anny acquisition reform [Ref 26]. Hopefully, the Battle Labs and WRAP will be able to 




IV. CASE ANALYSIS OF THE BSFV-E PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of the BSFV-E program reveals many lessons learned about the 
relationship of the Army's Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) process to the 
acquisition streamlining initiatives implemented in this program. BSFV-E is the Army's 
first WRAP venture which has progressed significantly beyond gaining WRAP Council 
approval for accelerated acquisition. This thesis is based upon a case study which relies on 
the BSFV-E program as the single point of data used to infer lessons learned about the 
WRAP process. These lessons are qualitative in nature and are founded upon factors 
critical in affecting the BSFV-E program. Additionally, these lessons learned are not 
designed to make any conclusions about the competency of the program management of 
the BSFV-E or the execution of the Battle Labs in their mission. Instead, they may 
provide insights to other acquisition managers and their staffs laboring to effectively 
manage acquisition programs which involve WRAP. In addition, these lessons may be of 
interest to students of acquisition management. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
The major lessons learned about the Battle Labs' A WE/WRAP process when 
applied to the BSFV-E program are: 
The experiences of the BSFV-E program reflect that although the Warfighting 
Rapid Acquisition Process (WRAP) proved conceptually valid, it suffered 
from a flaw in its lack of funding for approved rapid acquisition programs. 
The BSFV-E program illustrated an apparent disconnect in the Army's current 
WRAP policy. Though WRAP permits validated good ideas to be transitioned from the 
Battle Labs into WRAP Council-approved programs, the existing process ignores funding 
for these approved programs. Once the WRAP Council approves a TRADOC rapid 
acquisition priority, a "glitch" occurs. The BSFV-E received WRAP status and was one of 
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only two approved TRADOC rapid acquisition programs for 1995, but there was no 
money tied to the decision. 
Even though the current WRAP implementation policy states that WRAP approved 
programs will receive funding as prototypes for two years following their approval, it also 
states that these candidates are not guaranteed immediate funding even if submitted in time 
to place funding in budget and programming documents. The BSFV-E program indicates 
that WRAP falls short of its original intent. The situation today is that the Army possesses 
a workable means to streamline the acquisition of a great idea but this process comes with 
no money attached and is further hampered by the current absence of a clearly defined 
process by which that great idea is linked to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System 
(PPBS). It is important to note that without money, the process the Army possesses in 
WRAP is not acquisition reform, but idea reform [Ref. 17]. [Ref. 16] 
If the Army is truly going to pursue acquisition reform and expects Battle 
Labs to be involved in that reform, which they should be, and if the Army 
has chosen WRAP to be that mechanism for determining if a concept merits 
use by the operational Army, then the Army must have a means to fund that 
reform instead of relying upon someone like Mr. Williams to be a nice guy. 
[Ref 17] · 
This lesson learned is perhaps the most significant conclusion of this thesis. The 
Army must build a process which links funding to programs which successfully negotiate 
the validation phase of WRAP. The lack of funding can quickly transform a rapid 
acquisition program like BSFV-E into a conventional business-as-usual program by 
unnecessarily stretching out the program's life cycle and subsequently driving costs up. If 
WRAP is a "must do" process for the Army as advocated by General Hartzog, the current 
TRADOC Commander [Ref 9], then it should be prioritized as such and subsequently 
reflected in the Army's budget. Fortunately for the BSFV-E program, the intervention of 
Mr. Williams provided the necessary dollars for producing the initial eight systems to be 
used in the A WE set for Spring 1997. In addition, recent funding decisions on other 
programs have freed some funding to go to BSFV-E. Although BSFV-E is partially 
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funded for production of Force Package I, this did not occur as a direct result of the 
WRAP process. 
The WRAP policy [Ref 25] states that after receiving two years of funding for 
operational prototypes, subsequent resourcing will be based on Department of the Army, 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DA DCSOPS) prioritization of TRADOC-approved 
warfighting requirements. The experience of the BSFV-E program does not clarify how 
this will work in the future. This one data point indicates that this rough spot in WRAP 
funding may need more work. TRADOC's senior-most leadership is addressing the issue 
of funding for WRAP as this thesis is being written. [Ref 9] [Ref 26] 
The BSFV-E experience illustrates that the speed of acquiring WRAP 
approved programs can outstrip the timing of the existing POM funding cycle. 
It might be said that funding is a problem for all programs. The difference here is 
that for WRAP to be effective, it must launch new systems inside a PPBS cycle. 
Otherwise the launch's time line is just like a normal program's time line. The BSFV-E 
case also exemplifies how the current two year Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) 
funding process does not accommodate Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Programs which 
may progress from concept to initial operational capability in less than twelve months. This 
does not imply that the rapid acquisition under WRAP is too fast -- that is one ofWRAP's 
chief objectives. What it does highlight is that if WRAP operates as intended, then the 
PPBS cycle is structurally unable to react within the right time frame to fund WRAP 
programs. WRAP can provide the Army with a proven means to accelerate acquisition; 
however, as mentioned previously, this accelerated process becomes hamstrung and can 
potentially result in little more than rhetoric if funding is not secured. Perhaps by relating 
the initiation point of WRAP approved programs to the POM, the Army might be able to 
synchronize better with the PPBS cycle. 
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The success that the BSFV-E program has enjoyed to date results from 
the influence of many factors beyond the WRAP process and TRADOC's 
Battle Labs. 
The initial efforts of the Air Defense Lab proved that the underlying concept of 
integrating a Stinger launcher with a Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle carrier was feasible 
and achievable. TRADOC Battle Lab involvement and the BSFV-E's status as a WRAP 
Council-approved rapid acquisition program do not appear to be the only significant factors 
in this program's success. While the Product Manager [Ref 29], Program Executive 
Officer [Ref 36], and TRADOC System Manager (TSM) [Ref 17] all agree that the early 
experiments conducted by the Fort Bliss Battle Lab Support Element (the Air Defense 
Lab) were essential to demonstrate the potential of the BSFV-E program, they 
unanimously agree that many more intertwining factors also contributed to the program. 
BSFV-E benefited from the strong support of a "champion" from the Air Defense 
community. The Commanding General of the US Army Air Defense Center pushed the 
BSFV-E concept very hard and devoted Air Defense Artillery resources to the BSFV-E 
initiative developed by the Air Defense Lab. Had he not done so, the BSFV-E weapon 
system probably never would not have become a WRAP candidate. [Ref 20] [Ref 26] 
At the time of its participation in the BSFV-E program, the Air Defense Lab was 
an "unofficial" organization. The Air Defense Artillery community took personnel "out of 
hide" to create its own "unofficial" Battle Lab (which eventually became sanctioned as a 
TRADOC Battle Lab Support Element). This "unofficial" Battle Lab organization was 
essential to the launch of the BSFV-E program. Without the air defense community's 
support of the infant Air Defense Lab, it is questionable whether the BSFV-E would have 
been as successful as it has today. [Ref 20] 
Secondly, the overarching Battle Lab methodology and some of its processes 
provided much needed stepping stones for the BSFV-E. According to founding personnel 
within the Air Defense Lab, the Air Defense Lab consciously capitalized upon the initial 
confusion regarding the nature of Battle Labs. They took advantage of an Army -- and 
Industry-wide -- perception of General Franks' total, unwavering support of the infant 
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Battle Labs and the announced move of the Army towards General Sullivan's vision of 
Force XXI. The Air Defense Lab acted as an official Battle Lab even though it lacked any 
legitimate "clout." The Air Defense Lab used its perceived legitimacy to conduct its 
experimentation with the BSFV-E. Because no one had defined what Battle Labs were, 
the Air Defense Lab was given free reign to "tinker." This permitted the Air Defense Lab 
to validate the concept by which the BSFV-E evolved. [Ref 27] 
The time frame of the BSFV-E program's Milestone II decision and the convening 
of the first WRAP Council also contributed the success of the BSFV-E. When the first 
WRAP Council was convened, it needed several acquisition system(s) which would serve 
as test cases for its streamlined acquisition process. The Tiger Team, discussed in Chapter 
II, was given the mission to find candidate systems to be evaluated under WRAP which 
possessed a high probability of being transitioned from Battle Lab successes into rapid 
acquisition successes. Although much effort had been invested by the Air Defense Lab to 
further this program, it was almost a coincidence that the BSFV-E was selected from a list 
of nominated programs. Because someone familiar with the BSFV-E prototype was 
present at the briefing where formation of the Tiger Team was announced, BSFV-E was 
nominated for consideration by the first WRAP Council [Ref 27]. This illustrates that 
BSFV-E may have been a case of"being at the right place at the right time." 
Another successful aspect of the BSFV-E program has been the conviction and 
involvement of the high caliber personnel responsible for managing the BSFV-E program. 
Perhaps most importantly, in addition to being at the right place at the right time, it is clear 
that this program was fortunate to have the right people involved in key positions. During 
one interview, when the TSM [Ref 17] was asked to provide an assessment of how well 
the product manager had managed the BSFV-E program, the emphatic response was, "On 
a scale of one to ten, if ten is the top score then I'd give the program office a 15 ! " This 
positive sentiment was not limited to just the BSFV-E program office but the PEO as well. 
In nearly every thesis interview, Mr. George Williams, the Program Executive Officer for 
Tactical Missiles, was cited for his staunch support of this program. There was absolute 
consensus that if Mr. Williams had not been involved in supporting the program, BSFV-E 
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would have met an early demise. When questioned about why he backed the BSFV-E, 
Mr. Williams' personal belief in the program became apparent: 
I came to this man's Army in 1963 from the Air Force and at that time we 
had something called Redeye and something called Duster .... As I am 
leaving this job, we have a missile (Stinger) and we don't have a gun ... now 
if that's progress? ... We haven't extended the battle space, we haven't 
extended lethality, and we're just now getting around to integrating the 
sensors to where we can use the data they provide .... By the way, if you 
don't have this system (BSFV-E), why do you need all the sensor (systems) 
up front in the division area anyway? .. .! am absolutely scared to death that 
someday, five or ten years from now, the division will be at serious risk 
because we'll be fighting a battle that is not convenient for the Air Force to 
help us out in or we'll be in a place like the Falklands where we cannot 
bring to bear the things we've done in the past. ... I'm afraid in some future 
battle of getting ourselves waxed by some good group of helicopter flyers 
who can do what we do today with Apache Longbow, and that is eat an 
armored battalion's lunch and never even be seen. [Ref 36] 
Mr. Williams provided more than just political and moral support for the BSFV-E; 
since the program failed to receive money from the overall Army budget, he found the 
money to launch the program within his own organization. Due to the success of 
production on the Javelin and Longbow missile programs (two other acquisition programs 
within the purview of PEO Tactical Missiles), funding was able to be reprogrammed 
below threshold from those programs to the Stinger and BSFV-E line. This covered the 
cost of operational testing and provided initial funding for the prototype BSFV-Es which 
were scheduled to participate in the Task Force XXI. [Ref 36] 
BSFV-E and TRADOC's WRAP process were a fortunate "marriage." BSFV-E 
helped demonstrate the potential of WRAP. Also, the WRAP process moved the BSFV-E 
program along expeditiously. Each helped the other. When asked, the current TRADOC 
CG generally agreed with this mutually beneficial characterization of the WRAP and 
BSFV-E relationship [Ref 9]. 
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Analysis of the BSFV-E program reveals that Battle Labs help provide what 
has been a missing link between technical feasibility and user needs that was 
lacking in the previous system of warfighting requirements development. 
The experimentation role of the Anny Battle Labs within the overall framework of 
Force XXI was discussed in Chapter II. Battle Labs serve as a bridge between the user 
community and materiel developers during the requirements generation process. In the 
past, the concept based requirement system (CBRS) suffered due to a gap between these 
two groups. 
Old Materiel Requirements 
Determination & Acquisition Process 
Characteristics: 
• Threat Oriented 
• Stovepiped (Branch Focused) 
•Paper Based Requirements 
•High Technical & Cost Risks 
•New Starts Oriented 
•Sequential 
•Lengthy 
Figure 4-1. Old Materiel Requirements Determination After Ref [12] 
The old relationship, portrayed in Figure 4-1, can best be illustrated by an analogy 
in which users were on one side of a proverbial fence and the materiel developers were on 
the other. When the warfighters realized they had a need, they turned to Directorate of 
Combat Development (DCD) personnel who then generated their best impression of that 
requirement. In the old system, this requirement was then "thrown over the fence" to the 
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materiel developers. The problem was that the users possessed tactical competence to 
develop the requirement but did not know if what they were asking for was technically 
feasible. Since this was not their concern, it went over the fence to a materiel developer 
who would try to design a solution. If it went well, the design would mesh with the 
requirement. More often, this did not occur; instead the materiel developer would develop 
a design based on technical feasibility and then attempt to sell it back to the originator of 
the warfighting requirement. Ultimately, under this CBRS, the technical solution did not 
necessarily meet the tactical need. [Ref 44] 
The Army's experiences with the BSFV-E weapon system shows how Battle Lab 
organizations such as the Air Defense Lab have improved the previous system. Battle Labs 
serve as a bridge which links the user and combat development communities with the 
materiel development community. This facilitates the effective use of the integrated 
concept team approach discussed in Chapter II and results in a shortening of the "old" 
requirements determination process. This requirements streamlining, complemented by the 
WRAP process used in the BSFV-E program, resulted in the noteworthy speed with which 
Battle Labs Serve As A Bridge Between 
User & Materiel Developer Communities 
-- BSFV-E Example 
(New Materiel Requirements Determination & Acquisition Process) 
Characteristics: 
•Capabilities Oriented 
•Horizontally Integrated, Holistic 
•Experiment Based Requirements 













Figure 4-2. New Materiel Requirements Determination After Ref. [12] 
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that system has been developed. Capitalizing on this streamlining enables BSFV-E to be 
less expensive, a critical point in today's downsizing environment. Figure 4-2 illustrates 
how Battle Labs contribute to requirements streamlining. 
According to Mr. Rick Cosby [Ref 44] of TECO M's Analysis and Experimentation 
Planning Group, the process which Battle Labs provide to requirements generation is "at 
least an order of magnitude improvement in our ability to apply technical competence to a 
tactical need." Staffed by officers who are selected for their technical and tactical 
competence, Battle Labs have demonstrated the ability to articulate many more of the 
technical complexities of warfighting requirements. The Labs have also developed an 
alignment with the RDEC community which has promoted a better understanding between 
user and materiel developer. The resulting product should be an improved melding of 
technical and tactical factors. [Ref 44] 
Although it may be unfair and inaccurate to draw a tight comparison between the 
Sergeant York air defense gun system and the BSFV-E because the Sergeant York 
suffered from changing requirements and was limited by technology, the Battle Lab 
process did help BSFV-E avoid some of the pitfalls of Sergeant York. The early and 
extensive use of simulations, virtual prototyping and A WE results from the Battle Labs 
allowed the BSFV-E product manager to properly tailor testing by removing unnecessary 
test requirements without compromising certification of the system. In addition, the 
accelerated developmental milestones facilitated by the WRAP process also contributed to 
the BSFV-E program by shortening the acquisition cycle. In contrast, Sergeant York's 
testing stretched out so long that the threat it was designed to defeat changed before the 
testing concluded. [Ref. 46:p. 27] [Ref 48] 
Use of simulations by the BSFV-E program illustrates how the Battle Lab 
emphasis upon virtual prototyping can successfully accelerate programs. 
The prime contractor's use of a virtual prototype simulator (VPS) performed up to 
expectations and facilitated significant cost and schedule savings experienced in this 
program. According to the Boeing program manager [Ref. 43] for BSFV-E, VPS 
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contributed to the phenomenally short time (less than twelve months) that it took the 
contractor to move from contract award to completed production of the initial eight 
BSFV-Es. In addition to the successful use of prototyping in the Congressionally 
mandated ADA turret study mentioned previously in Chapter ill, the BSFV-E also 
benefited from the application of analytical testing of its critical components such as the 
Bradley chassis and the SVJvIL. This testing, which had already been accepted by the 
Army, significantly reduced the time the Army needed to test the integration of these 
components in the BSFV-E. VPS will also be used to train for the Task Force XXI 
exercise. 
The BSFV-E program provides a clear example that contractors do not receive 
a guaranteed advantage by entering into cooperative relationships with Battle 
Labs. 
The program examined in this study is one example of how working with the 
Army's Battle Labs does not offer a panacea to industry. In concept, Battle Labs were 
initially created to provide an interface between the Army user communities and industry. 
The Battle Labs were designed to offer a unique vantage point over technology that 
industry could provide to answer warfighter requirements [Ref 49]. The DoD has clearly 
stated its goal of adopting more commercial practices into its procurement policies; this 
DoD attempt to implement meaningful acquisition reform is evidenced by discontinued 
emphasis on military specifications and increased reliance on outsourcing [Ref 50, May-
June 96, p.4]. 
Working together with the Battle Labs, industry would receive use of Army 
evaluation resources such as test ranges and share data collected, for no fee. In addition, 
participating contractors could also expect to receive an indication of what battlefield 
deficiencies the Army was looking at. The idea was that contractors would receive 
feedback from the Battle Labs outlining both the good and bad points of a contractor-
provided concept. If a warfighting requirement subsequently surfaced which might be 
answered by the contractor's concept, then the feedback furnished by the Battle Labs 
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could be used to "fine tune" the concept and to enhance a participating contractor's 
competitiveness in a future source selection process. [Ref 36] 
At least two problems arose from this relationship with contractors. First, although 
there were no guarantees by the Government, participating contractors perceived that they 
would reap some benefits. In the case of the BSFV-E prototype developed by UDLP, the 
contractor acknowledged that it knew there were no guarantees that it would receive any 
special consideration. However, the Battle Labs process encouraged contractors to spend 
their own research and development dollars on projects and concepts. Industry is 
understandably cautious of arrangements where the risk of no return on investment is high. 
The eventual award of the BSFV-E contract to a contractor who did not participate in the 
early Air Defense Lab experiment of Stinger missile, Avenger launcher, and Bradley IFV 
chassis, illustrates that risk. Such occurrences may discourage industry from continuing to 
remain interested and participatory in Battle Lab experiments. [Ref 30] [Ref 36] 
Secondly, industry must exercise caution in all cooperative efforts with Battle Labs 
because, as Mr. Williams [Ref 36] said, "There are a lot of users out there!" In other 
words, in entering a cooperative effort with the Battle Labs, industry assumes the risk that 
Battle Labs might not be speaking for the institutional user. Battle Labs should not be 
mistaken as the sole voice of the user community. In their early years, this misconception 
may have resulted in unintentionally misleading industry representatives as to what the 
Army was really interested in. As the Labs have matured, so has the understanding by 
industry concerning the nature of their role. Army Battle Labs rightly are participants 
along with other TRADOC elements in forums to foster interchange between the 
contractors and the Army, such as the Advanced Planning Boards for Industry (APBI) 
arranged by the American Defense Preparedness Association. The APBI is designed to 
furnish industry with a view of the military's long range research and development, 
acquisition, and sustainment needs and initiatives. 
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The results from the Task Force XXI A WE may not be a fair report card for 
determining the effectiveness of the BSFV-E program or other programs 
participating in that Battle Lab experiment. BSFV-E's report card (and other 
Task Force XXI programs) must be written in developmental and operational 
testing. 
Although the BSFV-E product manager never intended to directly tie the program 
to the Task Force XXI A WE, he admits that without doing so the BSFV-E program might 
not have survived [Ref. 29]. In the midst of today's dwindling budgets, the BSFV-E 
project office found solid backing in the Army's strong support of initiatives to be 
incorporated into the Task Force XXI effort scheduled for early 1997. Recognizing that 
BSFV-E could benefit from Force XXI impetus, the project office did attempt to align 
itself with the preparation for the Task Force XXI A WE in areas where it made sense. 
However, the BSFV-E's future success does not rest on the success ofTF XXI. Nor is 
BSFV-E funding tied to TF XXI success. What the Task Force XXI A WE did provide 
was a means to justify going forward with the BSFV-E program quickly. [Ref. 36] 
When one considers that the underlying intent of A WEs is not to prove out a 
system, then it becomes easier to understand that the Task Force XXI is not an indicator of 
a given program's success or failure. A WEs were meant to experiment with some 
organizational and doctrinal concepts and hardware in order to gain insights into the 
Army's Force XXI vision; they were not conceived as a tool to prove a piece of 
equipment. This is not to say that if a given piece of equipment performs well in A WE its 
associated project office will not publicize that fact. However, if a specific piece of 
equipment does not perform up to expectations during the A WE, the Battle Labs will not 
necessarily be able to identify the true reasons behind the problem. Since the A WE 
performs experiments in warfighting capabilities, the Battle Labs' A WE will not prove out 
a system in the way that operational and developmental testing would. 
Even so, Task Force XXI will serve as a report card for the BSFV-E and other 
Task Force XXI programs, which may not be fair. In today's environment of downsizing, 
particularly in the RDT &E business, there is a perception that Task Force XXI is the only 
game in town. Right or wrong, programs sense that if they not participating in Task Force 
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XXI, they are not part of the game. Further, if they are not perceived as part of the game, 
then they will also risk being left out during the PPBS cycles. This perception has 
encouraged a mentality which unwittingly pits the various initiatives sponsored by Task 
Force XXI against one another. [Ref. 44] 
Much of the expected success or failure in Task Force XXI will hinge upon the 
soldier, training, or doctrinal employment aspects of the Task Force XXI A WE. The 
transition of the Anny into Force XXI is especially complex since it calls for more than just 
a change in the type of technology used; it demands that the Anny undergo a cultural 
change. People, and the organizations they comprise, have an inherently difficult time 
accepting this transformation. The change called for in Force XXI is monumental. In fact, 
Mr. Walter Hollis, the Anny's Deputy Under Secretary for Operations Research, noted 
that Force XXI may be too ambitious [Ref. 44]. Although there is little doubt that today's 
Anny possesses some of the best soldiers it has ever seen, it is important to recognize that 
these soldiers are still people with human failings. It is going to take some time for the 
soldiers of today to assimilate the many complexities of Force XXI and to put those 
complexities to their best advantage. If Task Force XXI is executed in the Spring of 1997, 
it may be that soldiers-operating the equipment may not have had sufficient time to 
familiarize themselves with it. [Ref 44] 
The current growth path for the BSFV-E lacks connectivity with other systems 
using the same chassis. HBSFV-E is not on a vehicle chassis common to other 
applications, some of the benefits of HTI might be at risk; logistics support 
will be at risk as well. 
As the Anny transitions to the M2A3 Bradley IFV at the tum of the century and as 
a digitized Force XXI takes on a more concrete form, it would be natural for the BSFV-E 
air defense system (which is based upon the M2A2 Bradley IFV chassis) to upgrade as 
well. However, according to the growth path for the BSFV-E, this contingency has not 
been appropriately planned for. Early research conducted with the BSFV-E project office 
identified this as an issue before the BSFV-E contract was even competed. However, 
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questioning of current BSFV-E program personnel does not show any clearly defined plan 
in place now to accomplish the transition to the A3 version of the chassis. [Ref. 17] 
What this highlights may be a shortfall in RDT &E and procurement funds which 
may prove significant for the BSFV-E program in the near future. Based on the progress 
of the BSFV-E to date, it is probable that this system will be fielded to at least Force 
Package I level. Assuming that occurs, divisional air defenders will experience gains in 
survivability and lethality well beyond the capabilities currently fielded in the "non-
enhanced" Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle. However, just after the BSFV-E 
improvements are realized by combat soldiers in the field, the Army as a whole may adopt 
the M2A3 Bradley IFV. The integration of mounting an SVML and the associated fire 
control components to a M2A3 Bradley is not the same as performing the modification to a 
M2A2 chassis. While similar in physical appearance, the complex software associated with 
the enhanced digital capability of the M2A3 makes this carrier a completely different 
vehicle than its predecessor [Ref. 51]. The bottom line is that after upgrading from the 
BSFV-MUA version of the M2A2 configuration to the M2A2-based BSFV-E, air 
defenders will be presented with the challenge of balancing the up-front research and 
development cost of adapting the BSFV-E to the M2A3 versus the logistics burden of 
maintaining a fleet ofM2A2-based BSFV-Es. No substantial work to integrate the BSFV-
E enhancements to the A3 have occurred to date. However, it is important to note that the 
Army's use of the M2A2-based BSFV-E will still significantly enhance its current air 
defense capabilities. This issue has been identified and is being currently addressed by the 
FAAD TRADOC System Manager and the BSFV-E project office. 
The BSFV-E program does serve as one excellent example of acquisition 
reform. 
Although there are unresolved design and funding issues and the BSFV-E has yet 
to be fielded to Force Package I units, the BSFV-E is an excellent example of acquisition 
reform. This view is supported by both the current TRADOC Commander [Ref. 9], who 
considers the BSFV-E effort to be an "extremely great example of how the Army can get a 
68 
capability into the hands of soldiers ... faster and cheaper than ever done before," and the 
Anny Acquisition Executive, who states that BSFV-E is "an excellent example of 
acquisition reform. [Ref 48]" 
When one examines the timetables which have been achieved in this program, it 
becomes apparent that BSFV-E embodies numerous major tenets ofrapid acquisition. In 
terms of delivering to the soldier a combat capability which works well and provides that 
capability in a quick and cost effective manner, BSFV-E serves as a positive example. This 
program portrays how an urgently needed warfighting requirement can be met through an 
accelerated acquisition process comprised of TRADOC Battle Lab experimentation 
followed by the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program's process. Figure 4-3 depicts the 
relative timetable differences between WRAP and the traditional acquisition strategy. The 
BSFV-E illustrates how the acquisition process was tailored into an effective NDI 
acquisition strategy: 
WRAP/AWE Process Significantly 
Reduces BSFV-E Acquisition Timeline 
TRADITIONAL ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
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Figure 4-3. AWE/WRAP Reduces Acquisition Time ofBSFV-E 
[Developed by Researcher] 
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• As one of the Army's first WRAP programs, BSFV-E's precedent-setting, 
streamlined acquisition process permitted a reduction in the administrative 
and procedural requirements which typically burden most weapon systems 
development. 
• The selection of the appropriate use ofNDI components lent themselves to 
a relatively low technical risk acquisition program requiring minimal 
integration 
• A low risk technical approach supported the use of a Firm-Fixed-Price 
(FFP) contract for the BSFV-E, which proved to be another successful 
factor for this program 
• The decision to compete the award of this program on the basis of a best 
value, FFP contract award, without any BAFOs, significantly enhanced this 
program's chance of success by accelerating the contracting phase of this 
program 
• This program's use of the Battle Lab experimentation methodology and 
simulations eliminated much of the developmental efforts of other 
traditional acquisition programs 
• The tailored test and evaluation (T &E) plan permitted the Army to modify 
this acquisition based upon its NDI classification. This allowed the required 
test and evaluation to be decreased by relying upon previously conducted 
component level testing 
• The use of IPTs and commercial specifications and standards in the 
acquisition of the BSFV-E serve as further examples of effective acquisition 
streamlining. 
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Examination of the BSFV-E program indicates that WRAP is not a one-size-
fits-all solution to acquisition streamlining; the WRAP process is most 
effectively applied to certain acquisition program types, like the BSFV-E. 
The accelerated development of the BSFV-E program illustrates that the 
Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program process can be very effective at streamlining one 
type of system acquisition. However, WRAP is not a one-size-fits-all acquisition 
streamlining toot there are specific programmatic characteristics which lend themselves to 
a more effective application of the WRAP process. These characteristics of 
appropriateness, gleaned from the BSFV-E experience, indicate that WRAP is best suited 
for acquisition programs which: 
• Have demonstrated an executable solution to a relevant, urgent Army 
warfighting need 
• Utilize mature technology posing low technical risk; NDI might often 
present such an opportunity 
• Do not require a new developmental effort ("new start") to occur 
• Capitalize upon a HTI modification 
• Are small in size -- WRAP is not appropriate for major ACAT I type 
programs 
• Are supported by a strong "champion" from the user community 
• Are supported by a committed materiel developer "champion" 
• Utilize a fixed-price type contract vehicle; this is consistent with low 
technical risk 
• Are low production quantity or include the use of exercisable contract 
options so as to be able to build upon success 
• Use contract incentives associated with key program or milestone events to 
spur contractors forward 
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• Require a level of funding which is below the established reprogramming 
thresholds for acquisition programs ($3.999 million RDT&E and $9.999 
million in procurement). 
C. SUMMARY 
Using the BSFV-E program as an example, this chapter has examined some of the 
acquisition streamlining measures found in the linkage between the Warfighting Rapid 
Acquisition Program and TRADOC Battle Lab experimentation. The lessons learned 
which are discussed in this chapter interpret the impact of WRAP based on the progress of 
the BSFV-E program alone. The Army's WRAP process has been influential in bringing 
about some of reform measures in this particular air defense weapon system. It may also 
be inferred from the BSFV-E program that it is not appropriate to indiscriminately apply 
the WRAP process to just any acquisition program in the hopes of achieving acquisition 
streamlining; this tool is most effective when used in unique circumstances addressed 
above. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
It is apparent that as the Defense budget diminishes, the emphasis upon acquisition 
streamlining will continue to increase. Program managers will require a clearer 
understanding of how to implement acquisition reform in order to remain competitive in 
this challenging environment as the Army evolves into Force XXI. In an effort to assist 
acquisition managers accomplish this task, this thesis examined some of the TRADOC 
organizations and initiatives which contributed to acquisition streamlining in the BSFV-E 
weapon system. The W arfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) policy and 
TRADOC's Battle Labs were examined for their influence on the progress of the BSFV-E 
program. It appears that the BSFV-E presents a good example of acquisition reform and 
exemplifies how TRADOC is involved in accelerating the Army's acquisition process. 
There are many factors which have contributed to the BSFV-E's success to date and this 
thesis offers some of the lessons learned. 
The fielding of the BSFV-E, along with the FAAD C2I/Ground Base Sensor 
(GBS), will complete the horizontal digitization of divisional air defense. Mobility, 
lethality, survivability and situational awareness will all be significantly improved. The 
WRAP-approved Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle - Enhanced is definitely not a 
"business-as-usual" program. Here is one example of how the Army is moving towards 
attainment of its Force XXI goals, this program reflects the challenges and rewards posed 
by implementing acquisition reform. When successful, the beneficiary is the soldier. 
B. SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED 
A summary of the lessons learned from the study of the Army's Warfighting Rapid 
Acquisition Program and its impact upon acquisition streamlining in the BSFV-E program 
is listed below: 
73 
• The experiences of the BSFV-E program reflect that although the 
Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Process (WRAP) is conceptually valid, it 
suffers from a flaw in its lack of funding for approved rapid acquisition 
programs 
• The BSFV-E experience illustrates that the speed of acquiring WRAP 
approved programs can outstrip the timing of the existing POM funding 
cycle 
• The success that the BSFV-E program has enjoyed to date results from the 
influence of many factors beyond the WRAP process and TRADOC's 
Battle Labs 
• Analysis of the BSFV-E program reveals that Battle Labs help provide what 
has been a missing link between technical feasibility and user needs that was 
lacking in the previous system ofwarfighting requirements development 
• Use of simulations by the BSFV-E program illustrates how the Battle Lab 
emphasis upon virtual prototyping can successfully accelerate programs. 
• The BSFV-E program provides a clear example that contractors do not 
receive a guaranteed advantage by entering into cooperative relationships 
with Battle Labs 
• The results from the Task Force XXI A WE may not be a fair report card 
for determining the effectiveness of the BSFV-E program or other 
programs participating in that Battle Lab experiment; BSFV-E's report 
card (and other Task Force XXI programs) must be written in 
developmental and operational testing 
• The current growth path for the BSFV-E lacks connectivity with other 
systems using the same chassis; ifBSFV-E is not on a vehicle chassis 
common to other applications, some of the benefits ofHTI might be at risk; 
logistics support will be at risk as well 
• The BSFV-E program does serve as one excellent example of acquisition 
reform 
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• Examination of the BSFV-E program indicates that WRAP is not a "one-
size-fits-all" solution to acquisition streamlining; the WRAP process is most 
effectively applied to certain acquisition program types, like the BSFV-E. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the examination of the W arfighting Rapid Acquisition Program's 
influence upon the BSFV-E, the following recommendations are made: 
• The WRAP Council should ensure that following all A WEs, all programs 
considered to be successful under the Battle Lab experimentation 
methodology and which can fulfill an urgent warfighting need be 
considered for assessment by the WRAP process 
• Funding for the WRAP process must be somehow built into the process; 
although the insertion of POM "wedges" or other designated pools of 
money in future Army budgets may prove impractical, measures need to be 
taken to eliminate the existing funding limitations now experienced by 
WRAP candidates and to provide a funding stream that contributes to 
WRAP success. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following areas were seen as open issues beyond the scope of this thesis and 
are recommended for further research: 
• Analyzing how other Services accomplish rapid acquisition using processes 
similar to the Army's WRAP program to highlight the 
advantages/disadvantages of each (e.g., the USAF High Gear Program) 
• Analyzing the effectiveness of organizations in other Services (such as the 
USMC Commandant's W arfighting Lab) which appear to have a similar 
role to that of the Army Battle Labs 
• Comparing the results of subsequent WRAP Council boards to determine 
long term effectiveness of the WRAP process and to develop a template for 
choosing future WRAP candidates 
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• Examining the benefit of applying the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition 
Program process on a major systems acquisition 
• Analyzing whether TRADOC should standardize the organization of its 
Battle Lab Support Elements 
• Analyzing the influence of the Battle Labs and their experimental 
methodology upon other rapid acquisition initiatives (such as the Advanced 
Precision Aerial Delivery System [APADS] or Avenger slew-to-cue) 
• Comprehensively evaluating the Army's Advanced Concepts and 









































APPENDIX A [LIST OF ACRONYMS] 
Aircraft 
Army Acquisition Corps 
Army Air Defense 
Army Acquisition Executive 
Anti-Air Warfare 
Air-Breathing Target; Air Breathing Threat 
Acquisition Category 
Army Combat Developer 
Advanced Concepts Manager 
Armored Cavalry Regiment 
Advanced Concepts and Technology 
Advanced Concept Technology Demo 
Air Defense 
Air Defense Artillery 
Air Defense Artillery C & C System 
Air Defense Anti-Tank System 
ADCS (Combat Development) 
ADCS Operations 
ADCS Training 
ADCS Test and Evaluation 
Air Defense C & C System 
Air Defense Lab 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
Army Digitization Office 
Air Force 
Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
Army Materiel Command 
Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity 
Advanced Precision Airborne Delivery System 
Advanced Planning Board for Industry 
Army Research Laboratory 
Army Systems Acquisition Review Council 
ASA for Research, Development, & Acquisition 
Army Science Board 
Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, 
and Logistics 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and 
Evaluation 
Air to Air Missile 











































Advanced Technology Demonstration 
Advanced Warfighting Demonstration 
Advanced Warfighting Experiment 
Broad Agency Announcement 
Best and Final Offer 
Battle Command (Battle Lab) 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle System 
Battle Lab Experiment Plan 
Battle Lab Experiment Senior Officer Review Committee 
Battle Lab Integration, Technology, and Concepts 
Battle Lab Integration, Technology, and Concepts Directorate 
Battle Lab Support Element 
Blue Forces 
Battle Lab Warfighting Experiment 
Board of Directors 
Battlefield Operating System 
Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle 
Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle, MANP ADS Under Armor 
Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle - Enhanced 
Command and Control 
Command, Control, and Intelligence 
Command, Control, and Communications 
Command, Control, Commo, & Intelligence 
Combined Arms 
Commerce Business Daily 
Concept-Based Requirements System 
Combat Development 
Contract Data Requirements List 
Cost Effectiveness Analysis 
Concept Exploration & Definition 
Concept Evaluation Program 
Commanding General 
Contract Line Item Number 
Combat Maneuver Training Center 
Course of Action 
Cost & Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
Commercial-Off-the-Shelf 
Chief of Staff, Army 
Combat Service Support (Battle Lab) 









































Defense Acquisition Board 
Defense Acquisition Executive 
Dismounted Battlespace (Battle Lab) 
Directorate of Combat Developments 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Development 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts, Doctrine, & Developments 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Mgmt 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Training 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Test and Evaluation 
Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab 
Deputy Director for Test and Evaluation 
Demonstration & Validation 
Dismounted Infantry Battle Space Battle Lab 
Distributed Interactive Simulation 
Director(ate) for Info Systems for Cmd, Cntrl, Commo, & 
Computers 
Divisional Air Defense 
Department of Defense 
Director, Operational Test and Evaluation 
Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation 
Defense Planning Guidance 
Deputy Project Manager 
Depth & Simultaneous Attack (Battle Lab) 
Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organizations, Materiel, 
and Soldiers 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, Operations Research 
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, Financial Management & 
Comptroller 
Early Entry, Lethality, and Survivability (Battle Lab) 
Enhanced Fiber Optic Guided - Missile 
Engineering & Manufacturing Development 
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System 
Experimental Forces 
Functional Area 








































F AAD Command & Control 
F AAD Command, Control, and Intelligence 
F AAD Command , Control, Communications, and Intelligence 
Forward Area Air Defense System 
Forward Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Firm Fixed Price 
Forward Looking Infrared 
Forward Line of Troops 
Fiber Optic Guided Missile 
Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation 
Force Package I 
Fire Unit 




Government Furnished Equipment 
Global Positioning System 
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
Horizontal Technology Insertion 
Integrated Concept Team 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
Initial Operational Capability 
Initial Operational Test and Evaluation 
Integrated Product and Process Development 
Integrated Product Team 
Infrared 
Independent Research and Development 
Integrated Sight Unit 
Justification and Approval 
Joint Venture 
Louisiana Maneuvers 
Louisiana Maneuvers-Task Force 
Light Armored Vehicle 
Line Of Sight-Forward-Heavy 
Line Of Sight-Rear 









































Man-Portable Air Defense System 
Manpower and Personnel Integration 
Militazy Specification 
Mounted Battlespace (Battle Lab) 
Milestone Decision Review 
Mechanized 
Missile Command 
Mission Needs Statement 
Measure of Effectiveness 
Measure of Performance 
:MICOM Research, Development and Engineering Center 
MANP ADS Under Armor 
Non-Developmental Item 
Non-Line of Sight 
National Performance Review 
National Training Center 
Operational Capability Requirement 
Operational Test & Evaluation Command 
Operational Requirements Document 
Office of the Secretazy of Defense 
Production & Deployment 
Program Executive Office(r) 
Program Executive Office(r)-Tactical Missiles 
Program (or Project or Product) Manager 
Project Manager-Forward Area Air Defense 
Rapid Acquisition Tiger Team 
Research and Development 
Research, Development and Acquisition 
Research Development and Engineering 
Research, Development, and Acquisition 
Research Development and Engineering Center 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
Regiment 
Request For Proposal 
Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition 
Required Operational Capability 
Rotazy-Wing 
Science & Technology 





























Subject Matter Expert 
Special Operations Forces 
Source Selection Agency 
Source Selection Evaluation Board 
SHF Tri-band Advanced Range Extension - Terminal 
Slew-to-Cue 
Standard Vehicle Mounted Launcher 
Synchronization Working Group; Simulation Working Group 
Test and Evaluation 
Technical Data Package 
Technical Evaluation Committee 
Test & Evaluation Command 
Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire- guided 
Training and Doctrine Command 
TRADOC Systems Manager 
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
Under Armor Auxillary Power Unit 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
United Defense Limited Partnership 
US Army Air Defense Artillery School 
Under Secretary of Defense 
Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
United States Marine Corps 
Virtual Prototype Simulations 
Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program; 




















[BSFV-E PROGRAM CHRONOLOGY] 
EVENT 
SECDEF cancels Sergeant York Program 
F AAD Working Group convenes 
SECDEF approves F AAD system concept 
ADATS selected for LOS-F-H role out of candidate evaluation 
involving four systems 
HQ DA approves BSFV-MUA concept to replace Vulcan air 
defense gun systems until fielding of ADATS 
SECDEF cancels ADATS 
BSFV-MUA fielding begins 
USAADASCH initiates Division Air Defense Study (DADS) to 
revisit F AAD and determine post Cold War force projection air 
defense requirements 
USSAADASCH Air Defense Lab begins cooperative 
demonstrations with industry on BSFV enhancements 
Congress directs a BSFV turret study 
Air Defense Lab proves BSFV-E principle by engaging helicopter 
with an ATAS equipped Bradley IFV 
DADS completed 
BSFVs participate in NTC 94-07 
PM F AAD conducts Virtual Prototype Simulation "shoot off'to 
evaluate operational effectiveness of three turret proposal 
alternatives 





















Air Defense Lab forwards BSFV-E concept to Tiger Team 
USAADASCH forwards BSFV-E ORD to PM F AAD 
USAADASCH forwards BSFV-E Urgency of Need Statement 
through TRADOC 
TRADOC Simulations Working Group approves use of analytical 
testing in lieu of actual requirements testing in BSFV-E program 
BSFV-E receives Milestone II approval from PEO Tactical Missiles 
as an ACAT IV program 
Congressionally mandated BSFV turret study completed 
BSFV-E Battle Lab Experiment Plan approved 
TRADOC approves BSFV-E ORD 
First Army WRAP Council convenes 
WRAP Council approves Milestone Illa decision to procure eight 
BSFV-E prototypes for Task Force XXI AWE participation 
Project office releases BSFV-E RFP 
BSFV-E contract awarded to Boeing Missiles & Space Division 
Boeing conducts contractor testing 
Completes IOTE 
Task Force XXI A WE EXFOR (scheduled) to receive 8 protoype 
BSFV-Es 
(Scheduled) Milestone III production decision to field Force 
Package I units 
(Scheduled) Task Force XXI A WE NTC rotation 
(Scheduled) FUE to Force Package I unit 
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APPENDIX C [REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS] 
• What is your opinion of the Battle Labs' use of the BSFV-E program as a 
representation of its positive effects (contributions to) upon acquisition refonn? 
• With respect to the impact of Battle Lab's and WRAP upon this specific program, 
has there been any perceivable value-added to the BSFV-E's development? If so, 
to what extent? 
• With respect to the impact of Battle Labs upon other weapon system development 
or procurement programs that you may be familiar with, are Battle Labs and 
WRAP contributing to acquisition streamlining? If so, could you cite some 
specific, brief examples? 
• What specific measures could the Battle Labs make to improve their current utility 
to the acquisition process? 
• In light of current budgetary environmental factors, is the BSFV-E viable? 
• What is the chief limitation of the Battle Labs and WRAP? Are there any principal 
systemic impediments to their ability to contribute to the Army? 
• Should Army Battle Labs remain external to, or should they be structured within, 
theDCDs? 
• In tenns of requirements generation, to what extent do the Battle Labs speak for the 
institutional user? 
• What is wrong, and what is right, about the current requirements generation 
process as it stands today? 
• Should TSMs remain external to, or should they be structured within, the Army 
Battle Labs? 
• Should Battle Labs take over the requirements generation from the TSMs? 
• Is the BSFV-E program an excellent, good, or poor example of proven acquistion 
refonn (streamlining)? 
• Is WRAP an effective fonn of acquisition refonn? 
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